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INTRODUCTION
As others have observed, the Supreme Court’s decision last Term
in Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Insurance Co.1 settles
little with respect to the Erie2 doctrine.3  For the purposes of diversity
actions in federal courts, the Court held, Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 23 trumps a New York state statute—New York Civil Practice Law
and Rules section 901(b)—barring the use of class actions “to recover
a penalty, or minimum measure of recovery created or imposed by
statute.”4  But beyond that, members of the Court agreed only at a
high level of generality about how to interpret the federal Rule.  And
there is no majority opinion explaining why Rule 23, construed to gov-
ern the question in Shady Grove, is valid.
If the Shady Grove opinions settled little, they raised a host of
interesting questions.  Like Professor Ides,5 I will focus in this Article
on the debate between the plurality and Justice Stevens concerning
the availability of as-applied challenges to the validity of rules promul-
gated under the Rules Enabling Act.6  And like Professor Ides, I will
argue that Justice Stevens has the better of the argument.  Having had
the benefit of reading a draft of Professor Ides’s article after I
researched this Article but before I drafted it, I will try to minimize
1 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010).
2 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
3 See Stephen B. Burbank & Tobias Barrington Wolff, Redeeming the Missed Oppor-
tunities of Shady Grove, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 17, 25 (2010) (“When the dust settled at the
end of the [Shady Grove] opinions, little was resolved.”); Kevin M. Clermont, The
Repressible Myth of Shady Grove, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 987, 991 (2011) (noting that
Shady Grove “does little to move the Erie doctrine”).
4 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 901(b) (McKinney 2006).
5 See Allan Ides, The Standard for Measuring the Validity of a Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure: The Shady Grove Debate Between Justices Scalia and Stevens, 86 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1041 (2011).
6 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072–2077 (2006).
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the extent to which I duplicate his insightful and persuasive
arguments.
Part I of this Article frames the question by describing the dis-
pute, in Shady Grove, over facial and as-applied challenges under the
Rules Enabling Act.  Part II reviews existing evidence for the possibil-
ity of as-applied Enabling Act challenges.  Although the Supreme
Court, famously, has never invalidated a rule under the Enabling Act,
some statements by rulemakers and by Justices support the possibility
of as-applied challenges to rule validity, and both the Court and lower
federal courts have occasionally entertained such challenges.  Parts I
and II introduce a distinction between two sorts of as-applied review,
which I will call (respectively) sub-rule as-applied review and state-spe-
cific as-applied review.  The crux of the dispute in Shady Grove con-
cerned the legitimacy of state-specific as-applied review; sub-rule as-
applied review, by contrast, seems less controversial.
Part III sets out to assess the costs and benefits of as-applied Ena-
bling Act review, with a particular focus on state-specific as-applied
review.  Subpart III.A sets the stage by briefly reviewing discussions of
facial and as-applied challenges in other contexts.  The choice among
facial review, as-applied review, and a combination of the two appears
to depend on both the institutional context and the nature of the
constraint that forms the basis for the review.  In subparts III.B and C,
I focus on the benefits and costs of as-applied review in the particular
context of Enabling Act review of federal rules.  Subpart Part III.B
suggests that though the rulemakers are attentive to the limits
imposed by the Enabling Act, they may not always be able to foresee a
rule’s future effects on substantive rights.  Admitting the possibility of
the occasional as-applied challenge to a rule’s validity permits ques-
tions of a rule’s effect on substantive rights to develop in the context
of concrete cases, before judges who are likely to have some familiarity
with the relevant substantive law concerns.  The information devel-
oped in such litigation can inform both a court’s evaluation of the
rule’s application in the case before it and future deliberations of the
rulemakers.
Subpart III.C considers the Shady Grove plurality’s arguments
against permitting state-specific as-applied challenges to federal rules.
As Justice Scalia pointed out, such challenges can cause uncertainty,
can be difficult to resolve, and can impair the nationally uniform
application of the federal rules.  But—cognizant of Justice Stevens’s
proposal that the threshold for an as-applied challenge be high—sub-
part III.C also considers the extent to which the costs of state-specific
as-applied review could be controlled by requiring a strong showing
before finding a rule invalid as applied.  Subpart III.D places the dis-
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uniformity argument in context by observing other features of federal
court practice that currently produce significant interstate procedural
variation, and by noting ways in which the federal system asks state
courts to tolerate similar disuniformity in state procedure.  Balancing
out the costs and benefits of state-specific as-applied review, I con-
clude—as Professor Ides does—that Justice Stevens’s proposed
approach strikes a reasonable balance: state-specific as-applied invali-
dation of a federal rule should be permissible but rare.7
I should note two limits of the analysis that I undertake here.
First, because this Article focuses on the Shady Grove debate over as-
applied review, and because that debate, in turn, focuses in large part
on the interstate variation that can result from such review, most of
my discussion will concern the federalism implications of the Rules
Enabling Act scope limitations.  Those limitations, in fact, have their
roots in separation of powers concerns, and should impose constraints
in federal question cases as well as diversity cases.8  It is possible to
conceive of a debate over as-applied review, in the federal question
context, that would very roughly parallel the debate on which this
Article focuses.  In the federal question context, the issue would be
whether a federal rule might prove to be invalid as applied to the
adjudication of a particular type of federal claim.  The costs and bene-
fits of that sort of substance-specific as-applied review would differ
from those on which I focus in Part III, and in the light of space con-
straints, I have chosen to focus my discussion on state-specific as-
applied review.
Second, I focus here on the methodological question of the
appropriateness of as-applied review.  The choice between facial and
as-applied review inevitably implicates choices concerning the content
of the limitation that the review seeks to enforce.  But the Enabling
Act’s constraints have not heretofore been defined with specificity,9
and I do not attempt a specific definition here.  So long as the reader
7 See also Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Sonia, What’s a Nice Person Like You Doing in Com-
pany Like That?, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 107, 110 (2010) (“Impermissible direct modifi-
cation, enlargement, or abridgement of a substantive right, as opposed to permissible
‘incidental’ effects on such rights, by a truly procedural rule will be rare (indeed, its
rarity is good reason not to shy from the prospect); but the possibility of recognizing
such forbidden effects should and does remain open.” (footnote omitted)).
8 See Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015,
1106 (1982) (noting that the Enabling Act was “designed to allocate lawmaking power
between federal institutions”).
9 See Burbank & Wolff, supra note 3, at 52 (“[R]easonable minds can differ
about what the standard for the validity of a Federal Rule under the Enabling Act
should be—albeit not about the primary goal of the allocation scheme employed
. . . .”).
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is willing to concede that the separation of powers thrust of the Ena-
bling Act limitations is properly supplemented—in diversity cases—by
federalism values, we can address the appropriateness of as-applied
Enabling Act review without attempting a more precise articulation of
those limitations.10  Similarly, in illustrating my discussion of as-
applied review I discuss a number of instances where the validity of a
rule’s application has been questioned.  In order not to distend fur-
ther an Article that is already overlong, I do not attempt to assess the
merits of those questions.  My focus throughout will be on the nature
of the method of review rather than on the answer that should be
produced by applying that method in a particular case.
I. SHADY GROVE ON AS-APPLIED CHALLENGES
It is worth noting, at the outset, that the petitioner in Shady Grove
conceded the general propriety of as-applied Enabling Act chal-
lenges.11  Thus, one might argue that Justice Scalia’s decision to ques-
tion the practice falls within a venerable Erie tradition of deciding
questions not raised by the parties.12  Justice Scalia, for the Shady Grove
plurality, attacked the practice of as-applied validity review, while Jus-
tice Stevens guardedly defended it and the dissenting Justices ignored
the question.  I will argue in this Part that the crux of the disagree-
ment between Justices Scalia and Stevens concerns not all methods of
as-applied review, but in particular what I will call state-specific as-
applied review.
10 It is, of course, true that the choice of a particular method for determining
whether a federal rule abridges, enlarges, or modifies a substantive right will affect the
degree of uncertainty and disuniformity that would attend as-applied review of a
rule’s validity under the Enabling Act.  Rather than attempt to assess the implications
of any particular interpretation of the Enabling Act, this Article agrees with Justice
Stevens’s suggestion, in Shady Grove, that the standard for as-applied Enabling Act
review can be calibrated so that it does not produce undue levels of uncertainty and
disuniformity. See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct.
1431, 1448–60 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
11 See Petitioner’s Reply Brief at 14, Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. 1431 (No. 08-1008)
(“Allstate correctly points out that the facial validity of a rule does not mean that the
rule can be applied in particular cases to abridge a substantive right . . . .”).  The
petitioner argued, however, that “state rules of procedure prohibiting class certifica-
tion [do not] create substantive rights that limit Rule 23.” Id. at 15 n.9.
12 See Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Story of Erie: How Litigants, Lawyers, Judges, Polit-
ics, and Social Change Reshape the Law, in CIVIL PROCEDURE STORIES 21, 22–23 (Kevin M.
Clermont ed., 2d ed. 2008) (“Neither party [in Erie] had questioned Swift or called
for its overthrow.”).
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Justice Scalia, joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Thomas and
Sotomayor, argued in Shady Grove that the sole test for a Rule’s validity
under the Enabling Act is whether the Rule “really regulat[es] proce-
dure”13  and “not whether the rule affects a litigant’s substantive
rights; most procedural rules do.”14 After asserting (in a passage that
others have understandably criticized as formalist15) that the availabil-
ity of class treatment is a mere “incidental effect” that “leaves the par-
ties’ legal rights and duties intact and the rules of decision
unchanged,” the plurality went on to reject the respondent’s argu-
ment that the New York statute was either substantive in its own right
or enacted to serve substantive purposes:
The fundamental difficulty with both these arguments is that
the substantive nature of New York’s law, or its substantive purpose,
makes no difference. A Federal Rule of Procedure is not valid in some
jurisdictions and invalid in others—or valid in some cases and inva-
lid in others—depending upon whether its effect is to frustrate a
state substantive law (or a state procedural law enacted for substan-
tive purposes).16
After citing Sibbach v. Wilson & Co.17 for this proposition,18 the
plurality continued:
Hanna unmistakably expressed the same understanding that
compliance of a Federal Rule with the Enabling Act is to be assessed
by consulting the Rule itself, and not its effects in individual applica-
tions: “[T]he court has been instructed to apply the Federal Rule,
and can refuse to do so only if the Advisory Committee, this Court,
and Congress erred in their prima facie judgment that the Rule in
question transgresses neither the terms of the Enabling Act nor con-
stitutional restrictions.”19
In the next part of the opinion, joined only by the Chief Justice
and Justice Thomas, Justice Scalia reiterated that his test for rule valid-
ity asks only whether the rule really regulates procedure—a test that
“leaves no room for special exemptions based on the function or pur-
13 Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1442 (plurality opinion) (quoting Sibbach v. Wilson
& Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941)).
14 Id.
15 See Burbank & Wolff, supra note 3, at 74 (arguing that Shady Grove may “stand R
as a monument to the collateral damage that results when single-minded formalism
crowds out sensible pragmatism”).
16 Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1444 (plurality opinion).
17 312 U.S. 1 (1941).
18 See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1444 (plurality opinion) (citing Sibbach, 312 U.S.
at 13–14).
19 Id. (quoting Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965)).
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pose of a particular state rule.”20  “Sibbach’s exclusive focus on the
challenged Federal Rule,” Justice Scalia explained, was “driven by the
very real concern that Federal Rules which vary from State to State
would be chaos.”21
Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion makes clear that he opposes as-
applied review of the validity of federal Rules, insofar as such review
would focus on the rule’s effects on a particular state’s system of
enforcement for substantive rights.22  But it is less clear whether he
really meant that in all instances a rule’s validity “is to be assessed by
consulting the Rule itself, and not its effects in individual applica-
tions.”23  The plurality itself, after all, inserted the following limitation
into its discussion of Rule 23’s validity:
Rule 23—at least insofar as it allows willing plaintiffs to join their separate
claims against the same defendants in a class action—falls within
§ 2072(b)’s authorization.  A class action, no less than traditional
joinder (of which it is a species), merely enables a federal court to
adjudicate claims of multiple parties at once, instead of in separate
suits. And like traditional joinder, it leaves the parties’ legal rights
and duties intact and the rules of decision unchanged.24
What led Justice Scalia to insert this proviso?  Did he have in
mind a possible argument that a non-opt-out class action might, in
some instances, transgress the limits of the Rules Enabling Act delega-
tion?25  Was he, instead, thinking about that rare type of class—a
20 Id. at 1445.
21 Id. at 1446.
22 The plurality also stated its view as follows:  “[T]he validity of a Federal Rule
depends entirely upon whether it regulates procedure.  If it does, it is authorized by
§ 2072 and is valid in all jurisdictions, with respect to all claims, regardless of its inci-
dental effect upon state-created rights.” Id. at 1444 (citations omitted).  Professor
Thomas Rowe has suggested that this reference to “incidental effects” might be read
to temper the plurality’s rejection of as-applied review:  “If the effect is not ‘inciden-
tal’ but of a direct sort that abridges, enlarges, or modifies a substantive right, conceiv-
ably under the plurality’s formulation § 2072(b) might still have some independent
effect.”  Rowe, supra note 7, at 107 n.3.  However, Professor Rowe acknowledges R
counter-arguments: “[T]he sweeping nature of the plurality’s assertion may leave
some judges thinking that no impact on substantive rights could ever invalidate a
Federal Rule, even as applied.  And other statements in the plurality opinion make it
appear that it indeed intends its universal-validity view in the strongest form.” Id.
23 Id. at 1444.
24 Id. at 1443 (emphasis added).
25 Cf. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 842 (1999) (observing that a strin-
gent interpretation of the requirements of FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(B) “minimizes
potential conflict with the Rules Enabling Act”).
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defendant class?26  Whatever the reasons, the proviso is intriguing,
given Justice Scalia’s statements in opposition to as-applied review.  It
seems to me that the opening of the quoted paragraph could be re-
phrased as follows: “Rule 23 is valid as applied to opt-out plaintiff clas-
ses.”  And this sentence’s implied corollary is: “But we are not saying
whether Rule 23 is valid as applied to, say, all non-opt-out plaintiff
classes or to all defendant classes.”
If that is a valid reading of the opinion, then Justice Scalia does
not oppose all forms of as-applied validity review.  As-applied review is
permissible, his opinion suggests, if the application-specific analysis
proceeds only with reference to the operation of the federal Rule.
Adapting terminology employed by Richard Fallon,27 I will call this
“sub-rule as-applied review,” to reflect the fact that this sort of as-
applied review implicitly divides a rule into sub-rules—e.g., “an opt-
out plaintiff class may be maintained if . . . ” and “a non-opt-out plain-
tiff class may be maintained if . . . ”—and assesses the validity of each
of those sub-rules separately.  What Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion
clearly opposes is what I will call “state-specific as-applied review”—
namely, a validity analysis that takes into account a Rule’s impact on
the ways in which a state’s system of procedure is intertwined with the
enforcement of that state’s substantive law.28  And it was with respect
to state-specific as-applied review that Justice Stevens took issue with
the plurality.
Justice Stevens’s partial concurrence first explained that a federal
court’s assessment of a state law, for Erie purposes, should avoid for-
malism; rather, the court should examine “whether the state law actu-
ally is part of a State’s framework of substantive rights or remedies.”29
When assessing the import of a state procedural rule, the question
should be whether the procedure is “so bound up with the state-cre-
ated right or remedy that it defines the scope of that substantive right
26 Cf. Debra J. Gross, Comment, Mandatory Notice and Defendant Class Actions:
Resolving the Paradox of Identity Between Plaintiffs and Defendants, 40 EMORY L.J. 611, 621
(1991) (noting “potential unfairness and due process violations inherent in defen-
dant class actions”).
27 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As-Applied and Facial Challenges and Third-Party Stand-
ing, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1321, 1325–26 (2000) (“[T]he meaning of statutes is not always
obvious, but frequently must be specified through case-by-case applications; the process
of specification effectively divides a statutory rule into a series of subrules; and in most
but not all cases, valid subrules can be separated from invalid ones, so that the former
can be enforced, even if the latter cannot.” (footnote omitted)).
28 What I am calling state-specific as-applied review can be seen as a particular
subcategory of sub-rule as-applied review.
29 Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1449 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment).
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or remedy.”30  And if a state rule turns out to be part and parcel of a
state’s system of substantive rights, then that fact—in Justice Stevens’s
view—should influence both the court’s interpretation of the federal
Rule and the court’s assessment of the federal Rule’s validity:31
[T]he second step of the inquiry may well bleed back into the first.
When a federal rule appears to abridge, enlarge, or modify a sub-
stantive right, federal courts must consider whether the rule can
reasonably be interpreted to avoid that impermissible result. And
when such a “saving” construction is not possible and the rule
would violate the Enabling Act, federal courts cannot apply the
rule.32
As if to underscore that his model contemplates the possibility of
as-applied invalidation under the Enabling Act, Justice Stevens quoted
a 1963 statement by Justices Black and Douglas “that federal rules ‘as
applied in given situations might have to be declared invalid.’”33
And—demonstrating that (in my terminology) his model contem-
plates state-specific as-applied review—Justice Stevens asserted that
[a] federal rule . . . cannot govern a particular case in which the
rule would displace a state law that is procedural in the ordinary use
of the term but is so intertwined with a state right or remedy that it
functions to define the scope of the state-created right.34
The dissent avoided entering into this debate.  Justice Ginsburg
(writing for herself and Justices Kennedy, Breyer, and Alito) con-
cluded that Rule 23 simply did not cover the question in Shady
Grove35—a conclusion that obviated any need to consider whether
Rule 23 (if it did control the question) would be valid under the Ena-
bling Act.
So Shady Grove raises—but does not answer—the questions upon
which I focus in this Article36: Can validity challenges under the Ena-
30 Id. at 1450.
31 Id. at 1450–51.
32 Id. at 1452 (citations omitted).
33 Id. (quoting Order Amending the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 374 U.S.
865, 870 (1963) (Black & Douglas, JJ., dissenting)).
34 Id.
35 Id. at 1469 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
36 I respectfully disagree with Professor Clermont’s assessment that after Shady
Grove, “if the pertinent Federal Rule regulates procedure, then it is valid and applica-
ble in all federal cases.  Period.”  Clermont, supra note 3, at 1019.  That would be true
if Justice Scalia had garnered five votes for his rejection of as-applied validity review.
But Justice Stevens specifically disavowed that rejection, and the dissenters avoided
the question.  Having only secured four votes in favor of rejecting as-applied review,
Justice Scalia did not alter the law on this point in Shady Grove.
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bling Act be as-applied?  And if so, can a court engage not only in sub-
rule as-applied review, but also in state-specific as-applied review?  In
the next Part, I survey the evidence on these questions from prior
rulemaking and judicial practice.
II. AS-APPLIED CHALLENGES AND PRIOR PRACTICE
A number of scholars have assumed that validity analyses under
the Enabling Act can be either facial or as applied.37  This assessment
reflects existing practice: there are precedents for reviewing a Rule’s
application in a particular context with an eye to the Rule’s effect on
substantive rights.  Serious occasions for such review may be relatively
rare, but they do exist.  In Subpart II.A, I second Professor Ides’s argu-
ment that neither Sibbach nor Hanna v. Plumer38 forecloses as-applied
review.  I then proceed to discuss additional precedents for such
review.  To assess further the extent to which these precedents shed
light on the debate in Shady Grove, I divide them into two categories—
precedents for sub-rule as-applied review (discussed in subpart II.B),
and precedents for state-specific as-applied review (discussed in sub-
part II.C).
A. Sibbach (and Schlagenhauf) and Hanna
Before adducing precedents for as-applied Enabling Act review, it
makes sense, first, to address the Shady Grove plurality’s assertion that
Sibbach and Hanna foreclose such review.  As Professor Ides persua-
sively argues, neither decision has this effect.  And, indeed, the
Court’s later treatment of Sibbach in Schlagenhauf v. Holder39 provides
support for sub-rule as-applied review.
In Shady Grove, Justice Scalia acknowledged that his reading of
the Enabling Act—by foreclosing as-applied review—appears to rest in
tension with the statute’s language:
It is possible to understand how it can be determined whether a
Federal Rule “enlarges” substantive rights without consulting State
law: If the Rule creates a substantive right, even one that duplicates
some state-created rights, it establishes a new federal right.  But it is
hard to understand how it can be determined whether a Federal
Rule “abridges” or “modifies” substantive rights without knowing
37 See, e.g., Stephen C. Yeazell, Judging Rules, Ruling Judges, 61 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 229, 246 (1998)  (“The Court has the ultimate responsibility of deciding
whether a Rule, on its face or as applied, violates the Rules Enabling Act . . . .”).
38 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
39 379 U.S. 104 (1964).
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what state-created rights would obtain if the Federal Rule did not
exist.40
But, Justice Scalia argued, Sibbach controls the question and Sib-
bach’s test—whether a rule “really regulates procedure”—should not
be abandoned:
Sibbach has been settled law, however, for nearly seven decades.
Setting aside any precedent requires a “special justification” beyond
a bare belief that it was wrong.  And a party seeking to overturn a
statutory precedent bears an even greater burden, since Congress
remains free to correct us, and adhering to our precedent enables it
do so.41
It is, of course, true that statutory stare decisis carries particular
weight.42  The problem with Justice Scalia’s argument in Shady Grove is
that, for the reasons that Professor Ides explains in this volume, Sib-
bach did not in fact rule out the possibility of as-applied Enabling Act
challenges.  As Professor Ides states:
[T]he context in which “really regulates procedure” first appears in
the Sibbach opinion includes these critical factors: 1) the challenge
in Sibbach to Rule 35 was facial, not as applied; 2) Sibbach conceded
that the right at issue was procedural, thus simultaneously satisfying
§ 2072(a) and eliminating any potential application of § 2072(b);
3) the phrase appears in a section of the opinion that rejects Sib-
bach’s effort to extend the § 2072(b) proscription to otherwise non-
substantive rights that are deemed “important” or “substantial”;
and, 4) the phrase, both in itself and when read within the passage
in which it appears, provides at best a cryptic and elliptical way of
announcing a rather bold and superfluous interpretation of
§ 2072(b).43
In fact, the Supreme Court’s 1964 decision in Schlagenhauf dem-
onstrates—in the context of the very rule upheld in Sibbach—the
Court’s willingness to consider as-applied challenges to a Rule. Sib-
bach had upheld Rule 35’s validity against a challenge by Mrs. Sibbach,
a plaintiff.44  Justice Goldberg opened his opinion for the Court in
Schlagenhauf by explaining that the latter case “involves the validity
40 Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1445–46 (plurality opinion).
41 Id. at 1446 (footnote and citations omitted).
42 I have recently relied on such an argument myself, with respect to a different
area of statutory law. See Catherine T. Struve, Shifting Burdens: Discrimination Law
Through the Lens of Jury Instructions, 51 B.C. L. REV. 279, 282 (2010) (finding only a
“dubious basis” for the Supreme Court’s decision in Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129
S. Ct. 2343 (2009), “to reject the 20-year-old Price Waterhouse precedent”).
43 Ides, supra note 5, at 1061–62 (footnotes omitted).
44 See Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941).
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and construction of Rule 35(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure as applied to the examination of a defendant in a negligence
action.”45  The Schlagenhauf Court characterized this issue as an
“undecided question[ ].”46  And though the Court ultimately rejected
the defendant’s challenge to Rule 35 in Schlagenhauf because it found
no reason to distinguish between discovery sought from defendants
and discovery sought from plaintiffs,47 it in no way suggested that its
validation of the Rule as applied to plaintiffs in Sibbach should have
foreclosed consideration of the Rule’s validity as applied to defend-
ants.  To the contrary, the Schlagenhauf Court held that the defen-
dant’s challenge—which was based on the asserted “lack of power in a
district court to order a mental and physical examination of a defen-
dant”—was sufficiently “substantial” to render a request for manda-
mus appropriate.48  To employ the terminology I introduced in Part I,
Schlagenhauf asserted (and the Supreme Court viewed as legitimate,
though unpersuasive) a sub-rule as-applied challenge to Rule 35’s
validity.
But what of the Shady Grove plurality’s reliance on Hanna?  As
noted above, in the plurality’s view, the Court’s 1965 decision in
Hanna “unmistakably expressed the same understanding that compli-
ance of a Federal Rule with the Enabling Act is to be assessed by con-
sulting the Rule itself, and not its effects in individual applications.”49
The unmistakable expression cited by the plurality is as follows:
When a situation is covered by one of the Federal Rules, the ques-
tion facing the court is a far cry from the typical, relatively unguided
Erie Choice: the court has been instructed to apply the Federal
Rule, and can refuse to do so only if the Advisory Committee, this
Court, and Congress erred in their prima facie judgment that the
Rule in question transgresses neither the terms of the Enabling Act
nor constitutional restrictions.50
Does this passage in fact reject the notion of as-applied chal-
lenges?  Its tone might suggest that the probability of error by the
45 Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 106 (1964).
46 Id. at 109.
47 See id. at 113 (“We can see no basis under the Sibbach holding for such a dis-
tinction.  Discovery ‘is not a one-way proposition.’  Issues cannot be resolved by a
doctrine of favoring one class of litigants over another.” (quoting Hickman v. Taylor,
329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947)).
48 Id. at 110.
49 Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1444
(2010) (plurality opinion).
50 Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965).
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rulemakers, the Court and Congress51 is low, but low probability does
not mean zero probability.  And the use of the term “prima facie judg-
ment” is suggestive: Prima facie means “at first glance,” and—used in
the legal context—the phrase contemplates that the prima facie
assessment can be rebutted by further evidence.52  Certainly, the
Hanna Court’s emphasis on the importance of uniform federal Rules
suggests a strong reluctance to find a Rule invalid due to its clash with
a contrary state practice.  But, as Professor Ides points out, Hanna also
“arguably invited the possibility of as-applied challenges to the Federal
Rules.”53  As the Hanna Court stated,
though a court, in measuring a Federal Rule against the standards
contained in the Enabling Act and the Constitution, need not wholly
blind itself to the degree to which the Rule makes the character and
result of the federal litigation stray from the course it would follow
in state courts, it cannot be forgotten that the Erie rule, and the
guidelines suggested in York, were created to serve another purpose
altogether.  To hold that a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure must
cease to function whenever it alters the mode of enforcing state-cre-
ated rights would be to disembowel either the Constitution’s grant
of power over federal procedure or Congress’ attempt to exercise
that power in the Enabling Act.54
The Supreme Court has asserted (citing Hanna) that the
rulemaking process and the Enabling Act’s report-and-wait require-
ment “give the Rules presumptive validity”55—but it is reasonable to
argue that this presumption should be rebuttable, if the rebuttal evi-
dence is strong enough.
B. Sub-Rule As-Applied Review
I noted in Part II.A that Schlagenhauf’s post-Sibbach challenge to
Rule 35 sought sub-rule as-applied review: Rule 35 was valid under
Sibbach, he argued, but not as applied to defendants.  And in addition
to the Schlagenhauf Court’s implicit validation of this sort of challenge,
51 As many have noted, inferences drawn from congressional inaction are by defi-
nition tenuous.
52 Thus, for example, Black’s Law Dictionary provides the following definition for
the adverb “prima facie”: “At first sight; on first appearance but subject to further
evidence or information <the agreement is prima facie valid>.” BLACK’S LAW DICTION-
ARY 1310 (9th ed. 2009).  And it defines the adjective “prima facie” as:  “Sufficient to
establish a fact or raise a presumption unless disproved or rebutted <a prima facie
showing>.” Id.
53 Ides, supra note 5, at 1062.
54 Hanna, 380 U.S. at 473–74 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
55 Burlington N. R.R. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 6 (1987).
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I have already noted the Shady Grove plurality’s suggestion concerning
the possibility of future sub-rule as-applied challenges to Civil Rule 23.
Separating out the category of sub-rule as-applied challenges
from that of state-specific as-applied challenges permits us to question
whether the 1963 statement of Justices Black and Douglas—cited by
Justice Stevens in his Shady Grove opinion56—provides clear evidence
in support of Justice Stevens’s position.  Justices Black and Douglas,
dissenting from the promulgation of the 1963 amendments to the
Civil Rules, vigorously criticized those amendments as impinging on
the Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury and as altering substan-
tive rights.57  In addition, they also suggested altering the structure of
the Enabling Act process.  Explaining their proposal to shift promul-
gation authority from the Supreme Court to the Judicial Conference,
Justices Black and Douglas asserted that “[t]ransfer of the function to
the Judicial Conference would relieve us of the embarrassment of hav-
ing to sit in judgment on the constitutionality of rules which we have
approved and which as applied in given situations might have to be
declared invalid.”58  But the dissent does not specify what sort of as-
applied review the Justices had in mind—so this statement could just
as easily have contemplated sub-rule as-applied review as state-specific
as-applied review.  To find precedents for the latter, we must look to
other sources.
C. State-Specific As-Applied Review
The possibility of state-specific as-applied review has been explic-
itly contemplated—albeit rarely—by the rulemakers, the Supreme
Court, and lower federal courts.  Three examples are illustrative.  In
section II.C.1, I describe the long-standing uncertainty over the valid-
ity of Civil Rule 23.1’s contemporaneous-ownership requirement as
applied to suits in states without such a requirement.  Section II.C.2
discusses the adoption, via amendment to Civil Rule 15(c), of a result
previously achieved by a lower court through what could be viewed as
the use of state-specific as-applied review.  Section II.C.3 notes the
Court’s apparent contemplation of the possibility of an as-applied
challenge to Civil Rule 41.  And section II.C.4 notes the existence of
additional lower-court decisions engaging in as-applied review.
56 See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431,
1452 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
57 See Order Amending the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 374 U.S. 865, 866
(1963) (Black & Douglas, JJ., dissenting).
58 Id. at 870.
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1. Civil Rule 23.1
For over sixty years, there has been an unresolved question
whether the contemporaneous-ownership requirement in what is now
Civil Rule 23.159 applies to diversity suits governed by the substantive
law of a state that imposes no such requirement.60  That, at least, is the
way that a number of commentators have put the question.  Stephen
Burbank, in pointing out the Enabling Act’s focus on separation of
powers (rather than federalism), has instead argued that the decision
whether to impose a contemporaneous-ownership requirement in
derivative suits is one that could not validly be made by the rulemakers
for claims under either state or federal law.61  Although Professor Bur-
bank levels a forceful critique at the discussions I recount in this sec-
tion, my purpose here is simply to note an instance in which
rulemaking participants and Supreme Court justices appear to have
contemplated state-specific as-applied review.
The contemporaneous-ownership provision—then contained in
Civil Rule 23(b)(1)62—was promulgated as part of the original pack-
age of Civil Rules.  Between the promulgation of those Rules and their
59 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1(b) (“The complaint must be verified and must: (1)
allege that the plaintiff was a shareholder or member at the time of the transaction
complained of, or that the plaintiff’s share or membership later devolved on it by
operation of law . . . .”).
60 For a useful discussion of this question, see 19 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR
R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 4509, at 288–91
(2d ed. 1996).
61 Professor Burbank has argued that
the [Enabling] Act, interpreted in the light of the pre-1934 history, would
require that, as between the Supreme Court exercising rulemaking power
and Congress, a decision to authorize (or not authorize) derivative actions
be made by the latter.  Similar reasoning leads to the conclusion that choices
with respect to regulations having a predictable and identifiable effect on
such a derivative claim are for Congress.  The contemporaneous ownership
requirement in Rule 23(b) appears to be of that type.
Burbank, supra note 8, at 1151–52 (citations omitted).  Professor Burbank notes that R
Rule 23’s contemporaneous-ownership requirement had previously been justified as
merely incorporating a preexisting rule of federal law. See id. at 1150 n.584.  As he
points out, if one turns to such incorporation as the justification for Rule 23’s treat-
ment of the contemporaneous-ownership requirement, it is necessary to identify the
source of authority for federal common lawmaking on this topic (because the preex-
isting federal law on this point had its origin in a Supreme Court decision rather than
a federal statute). See id. at 1152–53.
62 Original Civil Rule 23(b) required the plaintiff in a derivative suit to “aver (1)
that the plaintiff was a shareholder at the time of the transaction of which he com-
plains or that his share thereafter devolved on him by operation of law.” FED. R. CIV.
P. 23(b) (1938).
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effective date, the Court decided Erie.  And Erie led some to question
Rule 23(b)(1)’s validity. After considering the matter for some
years,63 the Advisory Committee issued a Supplementary Note to Civil
Rule 23 (without amending the Rule).  The Note set forth the issue—
whether the contemporaneous-ownership requirement “deals with a
matter of substantive right or is a matter of procedure”—but declined
to resolve it.64  Instead, the Note suggested that the matter was for the
courts to address:
If it is a matter of substantive law or right, then under Erie R.R. Co.
v. Tompkins [Rule 23(b)(1)] may not be validly applied in cases
pending in states whose local law permits a shareholder to maintain
such actions, although not a shareholder at the time of the transac-
tions complained of.65
After reviewing the lower court case law on the subject, the Note
closed by suggesting that the matter was best resolved in the first
63 The possible implications of Erie for Rule 23 are first mentioned in the minutes
of the Civil Rules Advisory Committee in October 1943.  Judge Clark explained:  “This
is the Erie Railroad v. Tompkins question.  The Reporter was directed to prepare a note
which would open the question . . . .”  2 Proceedings of Meeting of Advisory Commit-
tee on Rules for Civil Procedure of the Supreme Court of the United States 289–90
(Oct. 26–27, 1943).
64 The Committee was criticized for ducking the issue.  William Mitchell, the
Chair, reported to the Committee that certain New York lawyers had “raised hell with
the Committee because we didn’t have guts enough to come out in the rules and say
whether it was substantive or not.”  1 Proceedings of Meeting of Advisory Committee
on Rules for Civil Procedure of the Supreme Court of the United States 195 (Mar.
25–28, 1946) [hereinafter Advisory Committee Proceedings Volume 1].  Mitchell
recounted his response:
I wrote back and said, “If we hold that it is and eliminate it, that is all right;
but suppose we hold that it isn’t and leave it in there, how does that settle
anything?  What is to prevent somebody from litigating the question in the
Supreme Court, and can the Court lift itself over the fence by its own boot-
straps?”  They promptly subsided.
Id.
65 FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note (1946); see also id. (“The Advisory
Committee, believing the question should be settled in the courts, proposes no
change in Rule 23 but thinks rather that the situation should be explained in an
appropriate note.”).  By the time of the 1946 meeting at which the Supplementary
Note was last discussed, the Court’s then-recent decision in Mississippi Publishing Corp.
v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438 (1946), led Mitchell to express some hope that the Court
would uphold Rule 23(b) against the sort of challenge discussed in the Supplemen-
tary Note: “Since they have held that it isn’t a jurisdictional matter to extend sum-
mons outside the statutory limits, I am beginning to hope that they will sustain this
Hawes v. Oakland rule [i.e., the contemporaneous-ownership requirement] as not a
substantive right.”  Advisory Committee Proceedings Volume 1, supra note 64, at R
195–96.
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instance in the context of litigation, not rulemaking.66  But the Note
also suggested that if the Rule were to be invalidated as applied to
diversity suits that were governed by the law of a state that had no
contemporaneous-ownership requirement, the rulemakers would
then acknowledge that holding by amending the Rule:
The decisions here discussed show that the question is a debatable
one, and that there is respectable authority for either view, with a
recent trend towards the view that Rule 23(b)(1) is procedural.
There is reason to say that the question is one which should not be
decided by the Supreme Court ex parte, but left to await a judicial
decision in a litigated case . . . .
. . . If, however, the final conclusion is that the rule deals with a
matter of substantive right, then the rule should be amended by
adding a provision that Rule 23(b)(1) does not apply in jurisdic-
tions where state law permits a shareholder to maintain a secondary
action, although he was not a shareholder at the time of the transac-
tions of which he complains.67
Such a litigated case, however, never made its way to the Supreme
Court;68 and almost thirty years later the Court noted that the ques-
tion was still unresolved.  The Court’s discussion is worth quoting,
because though the Court took no position on the merits of such an
as-applied challenge, its description of the issue suggests at least tacit
approval of state-specific as-applied review:
66 FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note (1946).
67 Id.
68 In Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949), the Court did
address the question in dictum.  In Cohen, the Court held that a federal court sitting
in diversity in New Jersey and hearing a state law shareholder derivative suit must
apply a New Jersey state statute “which makes the plaintiff, if unsuccessful, liable for
all expenses, including attorney’s fees, of the defense and requires security for their
payment as a condition of prosecuting the action.” Id. at 543, 557.  In the course of
rejecting the contention that Civil Rule 23 occupied the field and excluded the New
Jersey state statute from operating, the Court reviewed the provisions of then–Rule 23
that applied to derivative suits (including the contemporaneous-ownership require-
ment) and concluded that “[t]hese provisions neither create nor exempt from liabili-
ties, but require complete disclosure to the court and notice to the parties in interest.
None conflict with the statute in question and all may be observed by a federal court,
even if not applicable in state court.” Id. at 556.  The Cohen Court thus apparently
approved the application of the contemporaneous-ownership requirement even in
suits involving state law claims where the state in question would not impose a con-
temporaneous-ownership requirement; as the Court put it, “the federal court will not
permit itself to be used to litigate a purchased grievance or become a party to specula-
tion in wrongs done to corporations.” Id. This statement, however, was dictum
because the contemporaneous-ownership requirement’s application was not at issue
in Cohen.
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The “contemporaneous ownership” requirement in share-
holder derivative actions was first announced in Hawes v. Oakland,
and soon thereafter adopted as Equity Rule 97. This provision was
later incorporated in Equity Rule 27 and finally in the present Rule
23.1.  After the decision in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, the question
arose whether the contemporaneous-ownership requirement was
one of procedure or substantive law.  If the requirement were sub-
stantive, then under the regime of Erie it could not be validly
applied in federal diversity cases where state law permitted a non-
contemporaneous shareholder to maintain a derivative action.
Although most cases treat the requirement as one of procedure, this
Court has never resolved the issue.69
2. Civil Rule 15(c)
The evolution of Civil Rule 15(c)’s relation-back provision
reflects attention to the provision’s implications in cases where the law
setting the statute of limitations for a claim would take a more gener-
ous approach to relation back.  After such considerations were
weighed by a court of appeals in what can be seen as state-specific as-
applied review, the Supreme Court appeared to disregard (or at least
omit to consider) the issue in Schiavone v. Fortune.70  Responding to
Schiavone, the rulemakers in 1991 amended Rule 15 so that it incorpo-
rates any more generous relation-back provision in the relevant limita-
tions law.
In Marshall v. Mulrenin,71 the First Circuit refused to conclude
that Rule 15(c), as it then stood, barred relation back in a case where
Massachusetts law (which gave rise to the claim) would have permitted
relation back.  The Marshall court reasoned that “a [federal] rule is
not to be applied to the extent, if any, that it would defeat rights aris-
ing from state substantive law as distinguished from state proce-
69 Bangor Punta Operations, Inc. v. Bangor & Aroostook R.R. Co., 417 U.S. 703,
708 n.4 (1974) (citations omitted).
70 477 U.S. 21 (1986).
71 508 F.2d 39 (1st Cir. 1974).
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dure.”72  But when the Supreme Court later addressed a similar
question in Schiavone v. Fortune,73 it took a different approach.
Schiavone involved diversity actions commenced by filing com-
plaints naming as the defendant “Fortune”—a mistake, because the
proper defendant was Time, Inc.74  Though the original complaints
were filed within the applicable state statute of limitations and though
amended complaints (naming Time, Inc. as a defendant) were served
on Time, Inc., within the period set by Civil Rule 4(m) for serving a
summons and complaint (measured from the complaint’s original fil-
72 Id. at 44.  I am indebted to Professor Ides for pointing out that Marshall can be
viewed as an example of as-applied rule invalidation. See Posting of Professor Allan
Ides to civ-pro@listserv.nd.edu (Nov. 20, 2009) (on file with author); see also WRIGHT,
MILLER & COOPER, supra note 60, § 4509, at 282 (noting that in Marshall, “application R
of a Civil Rule was not automatic, but instead depended upon a careful analysis of a
conflicting state rule”).
Professor Clermont’s thoughtful article in this issue argues that Marshall is not an
example of as-applied invalidation but rather an instance in which the court held
Rule 15(c) inapplicable to the case at hand. See Clermont, supra note 3, at 1008–09 &
n.99.  But the discussion in Marshall indicates that the court read Rule 15(c) to cover
the issue at hand: “In the case at bar,” the court stated, “there is in fact a true conflict
between the federal amendment of parties rule and the Massachusetts statute.” Mar-
shall, 508 F.2d at 44.  Two paragraphs later the court reasoned as follows:
Although Rule 15, on its face, conflicts with [the Massachusetts statute], to
apply the rule would mean that the choice of forum “would wholly bar recov-
ery.”  We do not read Hanna to mean that although the statute of limitations
would be tolled if an action were brought on the state side, because of the
civil rules it will run if brought in the federal court.  We accordingly hold
that [the Massachusetts statute] permits the amendment adding appellees as
defendants to relate back for the purpose of the Massachusetts statute of
limitations in spite of the contrary provisions of Rule 15.
Id. at 44–45 (citations omitted).  Professor Clermont has pointed out that Marshall
does not cite the Rules Enabling Act; the case’s only oblique reference to the Act is its
description of Hanna’s holding concerning the validity of Rule 4(d)(1).  But it is diffi-
cult to conclude that the Marshall court’s ruling merely concerned applicability (as
opposed to validity).  There do, of course, exist cases that narrowly construe a rule
and thus hold it inapplicable to a given question; but in those instances, courts are
typically careful to say that the Federal Rule does not, in fact, govern the question at
hand.  See infra notes 123–31 and accompanying text.  If the Marshall court was simply R
saying that Rule 15(c) did not purport to govern the question at hand, then why did it
find a “true conflict” between that Rule and the state statute?  Alternatively, if the
Marshall court recognized that Rule 15(c) purported to govern the matter at hand, on
what basis could it refuse to apply that Rule without questioning its validity as applied
to the case at hand?  For these reasons, though I recognize the points supporting
Professor Clermont’s reading of Marshall, I believe that the case can also be read,
instead, as an example of as-applied invalidation.
73 477 U.S. 21 (1986).
74 See id. at 22–23.
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ing),75 the Court held that the amendments did not relate back under
the then-applicable version of Rule 15(c) because the applicable stat-
ute of limitations (as calculated by the court of appeals) had already
run before Time, Inc. received notice of the suit.76
Both the majority and the dissent in Schiavone focused their
debate on Rule 15(c); neither gave attention to a provision in New
Jersey state law that—plaintiffs had contended below—would have
permitted relation back.  The court of appeals had dismissed the
plaintiffs’ contention about relation back under New Jersey law on the
ground that, by conceding in the district court that the New Jersey
relation-back provision was procedural rather than substantive, the
plaintiffs had waived any argument that Erie  required application of
the state relation-back provision.77  By the time that the plaintiffs
briefed the merits of the case in the Supreme Court, they had evi-
dently abandoned any attempt to rely on the New Jersey relation-back
provision.78  Thus, the decision left unresolved whether Rule 15(c)
should be read to displace a more generous state relation-back
provision.
The rulemaking process responded to this uncertainty.  In 1991,
Rule 15(c) was amended “to make it clear that the rule does not apply
to preclude any relation back that may be permitted under the appli-
cable limitations law.”79  Citing Marshall with approval, the committee
note accompanying the 1991 amendment explained that “[w]hatever
may be the controlling body of limitations law, if that law affords a
more forgiving principle of relation back than the one provided in
75 See id. at 33 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
76 See id. at 30 (majority opinion).
77 See Schiavone v. Fortune, 750 F.2d 15, 18-19 (3d Cir. 1984), aff’d, 477 U.S. 21
(1986).
78 See Brief for Petitioners, Schiavone, 477 U.S. 21 (No. 84-1839); Reply Brief for
Petitioners, Schiavone, 477 U.S. 21 (No. 84-1839).
79 FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c) committee note (1991).  My goal in this section is to con-
sider the extent to which prior practice provides examples of state-specific as-applied
review, but not to attempt an assessment of whether a given rule, as applied in a given
situation, actually does violate the Enabling Act.  I thus leave aside, for purposes of
this discussion, the debate over whether Enabling Act concerns are raised in instances
when Rule 15’s relation-back provisions are more generous than those in the law that
supplies the statute of limitations. See GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., PLEADING AND
PROCEDURE 555 (8th ed. 1999) (asking why “the state relation back doctrine [should]
control over Rule 15(c) only when it is more generous,” and noting the argument
“that a federal relation-back rule different from the state rule will always abridge
someone’s state right”); cf. WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 60, § 4509, at R
272–88 (arguing that it does not violate the Enabling Act for Rule 15(c) to include a
more generous relation-back provision).
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this rule, it should be available to save the claim.”80  To the extent that
Schiavone “implie[d] the contrary,” the committee note stated, the
1991 amendment was intended to displace Schiavone.81
3. Civil Rule 41
In Semtek International Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp.,82 the Court
held that Civil Rule 41(b)’s provision concerning when an involuntary
dismissal “operates as an adjudication upon the merits”83 merely gov-
erns the judgment’s effect on an action re-filed in the same federal
district court.  “[T]he dismissal in the present case barred refiling of
the same claim in the United States District Court for the Central Dis-
trict of California. That is undoubtedly a necessary condition, but it is
not a sufficient one, for claim-preclusive effect in other courts.”84
The Court’s reading of Rule 41(b) is of obvious interest to those
studying the Enabling Act’s influence on the interpretation of the fed-
eral Rules.  But for present purposes I wish to focus instead on the
Court’s caveat concerning what its ruling did not do.  Justice Scalia,
writing for the unanimous Court, included the following footnote:
We do not decide whether, in a diversity case, a federal court’s “dis-
missal upon the merits” (in the sense we have described), under
circumstances where a state court would decree only a “dismissal
without prejudice,” abridges a “substantive right” and thus exceeds
the authorization of the Rules Enabling Act.  We think the situation
will present itself more rarely than would the arguable violation of
the Act that would ensue from interpreting Rule 41(b) as a rule of
claim preclusion; and if it is a violation, can be more easily dealt
with on direct appeal.85
This caveat, it seems to me, explicitly leaves open the possibility of
a state-specific as-applied validity challenge to Civil Rule 41(b).
80 FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c) committee note (1991).
81 Id.
82 531 U.S. 497 (2001).
83 Id. at 501 (quoting the then-applicable version of Civil Rule 41(b)).  When
Civil Rule 41(b) was restyled in 2007, “upon the merits” became “on the merits.” See
FED. R. CIV. P. 41 committee note (2007) (explaining that the restyling changes were
“intended to be stylistic only”).
84 Semtek, 531 U.S. at 506.
85 Id. at 506 n.2.
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4. Other Rules
Without attempting a comprehensive listing of cases in which a
court has engaged in as-applied validity review under the Enabling
Act, I will mention two further examples.
In Exxon Corp. v. Burglin,86 the fact that the Supreme Court had
specifically considered the validity of Appellate Rule 38 less than eight
years earlier did not prevent the Fifth Circuit from examining
whether Rule 38 could validly apply in a case governed by Alaska sub-
stantive law.87  An Alaska rule authorized appellate courts to “allow a
party prevailing on appeal to recover partial attorneys’ fees and costs
incurred on appeal or, in the case of a frivolous suit, full fees.”88  As
the court noted, “[b]y allowing even minimal recovery of attorneys’
fees in every civil appeal, Alaska Rule 508 directly collides with FED. R.
APP. P. 38, which allows the recovery of attorneys’ fees only in the case
of a frivolous appeal.”89  Because the Court in Burlington Northern Rail-
road Co. v. Woods90  had already upheld Rule 38’s validity,91 the Exxon
court reasoned that in the present case it “need only consider [Rule
86 42 F.3d 948 (5th Cir. 1995).
87 Exxon Corp. may be taken to represent the views of judges familiar with the
Enabling Act process.  At the time of the decision, the opinion’s author was a member
of the Appellate Rules Committee and another member of the panel chaired the Civil
Rules Committee.
88 Exxon Corp., 42 F.3d at 950.
89 Id. (citing Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 7 (1987)).
90 480 U.S. 1 (1987).
91 The Supreme Court’s analysis in Burlington had relied on the Alabama
Supreme Court’s reading of an Alabama statute when concluding that Appellate Rule
38 conflicted with that state statute. See Burlington N. R.R. Co., 480 U.S. at 1.  Appel-
late Rule 38 provides a court of appeals with discretion to impose a penalty for a
frivolous appeal. See FED. R. APP. P. 38.  The Alabama statute brooked no such discre-
tion; it mandated a ten percent penalty whenever a money judgment that had been
stayed pending appeal was affirmed.  In addition to the fact that the discretionary
Rule 38 analysis contrasted with the mandatory nature of the state penalty, the Court
found evidence of conflict between the two provisions because “the purposes underly-
ing the Rule are sufficiently coextensive with the asserted purposes of the Alabama
statute to indicate that the Rule occupies the statute’s field of operation so as to pre-
clude its application in federal diversity actions.” Burlington N. R.R. Co., 480 U.S. at 7.
And to evidence the purposes of the state statute, the Court cited decisions by the
Alabama Supreme Court:
The purposes of the mandatory affirmance penalty are to penalize frivolous
appeals and appeals interposed for delay, and to provide “additional dam-
ages” as compensation to the appellees for having to suffer the ordeal of
defending the judgments on appeal.
Id. at 4 (citing Birmingham v. Bowen, 47 So. 2d 174, 179–80 (Ala. 1950); Montgomery
Light & Water Power Co. v. Thombs, 87 So. 205, 211 (Ala. 1920)).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\86-3\NDL305.txt unknown Seq: 23 11-AUG-11 13:11
2011] as-applied  challenges  under  the  rules  enabling  act 1203
38’s] as-applied legitimacy.”92  After some analysis, the court con-
cluded that “because the issue of attorneys’ fees on appeal under
Alaska law is one of procedure, we hold that, in this case, FED. R. APP.
P. 38 does not violate the limitations of the Rules Enabling Act.”93
Professor Thomas Rowe has adduced another example of state-
specific as-applied review.94  In Douglas v. NCNB Texas National Bank,95
the Fifth Circuit held that a creditor’s debt collection claims should
not be viewed as having been compulsory counterclaims in the debt-
ors’ prior federal diversity class action against the creditor.  Stating
that a court “must not apply a federal rule of civil procedure if appli-
cation of the rule violates either the Constitution or the Rules Ena-
bling Act,”96 the Douglas court reasoned that
[u]nder Texas law, lenders have a substantive right to elect judicial
or nonjudicial foreclosure in the event of a default, and debtors
have no right to force the lender to pursue a judicial foreclosure
remedy. Application of rule 13(a) in the instant case would abridge
the lender’s substantive rights and enlarge the debtor’s substantive
rights.97
Though the Douglas court’s antecedent assumption that Rule 13
would ordinarily govern the preclusive effect of a prior judgment
requires further examination,98 the case does provide an example of
as-applied invalidation.
III. BENEFITS AND COSTS OF AS-APPLIED REVIEW
Thus far, we have seen that as-applied review of the validity of
federal Rules is not unheard of.  But is it desirable?  And how does the
debate over as-applied review for federal Rules fit within the larger
debate over as-applied and facial review in other contexts?  Part III.A.
considers that larger debate, and concludes that the choice among as-
applied review, facial review, and a combination of the two depends
upon the costs and benefits of those options in the particular context
92 Exxon Corp., 42 F.3d at 950.
93 Id. at 952.
94 See Rowe, supra note 7, at 111 (discussing Douglas v. NCNB Tex. Nat’l Bank, R
979 F.2d 1128 (5th Cir. 1992)).
95 979 F.2d 1128 (5th Cir. 1992).
96 Id. at 1130.
97 Id.
98 See Stephen B. Burbank, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, Full Faith and Credit and
Federal Common Law: A General Approach, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 733, 772 (1986) (“Aside
from the fact that it governs procedure in the rendering court, which lacks the power
finally to determine the preclusive effects of its judgment, Rule 13(a) does not in so
many words and could not validly provide a rule of preclusion.”).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\86-3\NDL305.txt unknown Seq: 24 11-AUG-11 13:11
1204 notre dame law review [vol. 86:3
at issue.  Subpart III.B considers the possible benefits of as-applied
Enabling Act review, and subpart III.C considers the possible costs.
Because one of the most significant costs of state-specific as-applied
validity review is interstate variation in the applicability of federal
rules, subpart III.D considers the extent to which the federal court
system already tolerates such variation, and (by way of comparison)
notes that the federal system sometimes requires state courts to toler-
ate a similar disruption of the uniform application of their own state
procedures.
A. As-Applied Review in Other Contexts
How do adjudicators determine whether to engage in facial or as-
applied review?  Most of the discussions of this question have arisen in
the context of constitutional challenges.  In that context, Richard Fal-
lon has noted that
[t]raditional thinking has long held that the normal if not exclusive
mode of . . . adjudication involves an as-applied challenge, in which
a party argues that a statute cannot be applied to her because its
application would violate her personal constitutional rights.  Within
the customary understanding, “facial” attacks maintaining that a
statute is more generally invalid were considered rare and suspect.
And “overbreadth” doctrine, which allows a statute to be challenged
facially on the ground that it has too many unconstitutional applica-
tions, was thought to be limited mostly if not exclusively to the First
Amendment.99
This conventional model has been subject to debate,100 and the
Justices have differed concerning the approach to apply to various
sorts of constitutional challenges.  Because Justice Scalia took the
opportunity in Shady Grove to call into question the use of as-applied
review—or, at least, the use of state-specific as-applied review—in the
context of Enabling Act challenges, it is interesting to consider his
preferences concerning facial and as-applied review in other contexts.
It turns out that Justice Scalia’s preferred approaches span a spec-
trum: for cases that he views as posing challenges to federal legislative
power he has advocated facial challenges but would permit as-applied
99 Fallon, supra note 27, at 1321 (footnotes omitted). R
100 See, e.g., Matthew D. Adler, Rights, Rules, and the Structure of Constitutional Adjudi-
cation: A Response to Professor Fallon, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1371, 1390 (2000) (observing
that Supreme Court “case law is—to be frank—confused and incoherent on the issue
of ‘facial’ and ‘as-applied’ challenges”); Edward A. Hartnett, Modest Hope for a Modest
Roberts Court: Deference, Facial Challenges, and the Comparative Competence of Courts, 59
SMU L. REV. 1735, 1749 (2006) (“[D]ispute, confusion, and uncertainty regarding
facial versus as-applied constitutional challenges are becoming ubiquitous.”).
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challenges as a fallback; for cases that he views as posing challenges
based on individual constitutional rights he would prefer only as-
applied and not facial challenges; and (as we have seen) for Enabling
Act challenges to federal Rules he would never permit as-applied
review and would invalidate a Rule only if it is facially invalid.
In the context of individual rights–based constitutional chal-
lenges, Justice Scalia is viewed as a leading proponent of as-applied,
rather than facial, review.101  On a number of occasions he has
defended the Court’s statement in United States v. Salerno102 that “[a]
facial challenge to a legislative Act is, of course, the most difficult chal-
lenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that
no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid.”103
In Justice Scalia’s view, the proper role of a federal court is to decide
only the particular dispute before the court—a duty that requires at
most a determination “that the statute is unconstitutional as applied
to this party, in the circumstances of this case.”104
By contrast, Justice Scalia would relax this restriction on facial
challenges in the context of challenges based on limits on legislative
power.105  As he asserted in Nevada Department of Human Resources v.
Hibbs106:
When a litigant claims that legislation has denied him individ-
ual rights secured by the Constitution, the court ordinarily asks first
whether the legislation is constitutional as applied to him. When, on
the other hand, a federal statute is challenged as going beyond Con-
gress’s enumerated powers, under our precedents the court first
asks whether the statute is unconstitutional on its face.107
This passage in Hibbs might, at first glance, be taken to support
Justice Scalia’s preference for facial over as-applied challenges under
the Enabling Act.  After all, Enabling Act challenges assert that the
rulemakers exceeded the scope of their delegated powers.  But in
Hibbs, Justice Scalia took pains to make clear that his preference for
101 See, e.g., Marc E. Isserles, Overcoming Overbreadth: Facial Challenges and the Valid
Rule Requirement, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 359, 376 (1998) (“Scalia, joined by three other
Justices, has emerged as Salerno’s most outspoken defender.”).
102 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
103 Id. at 745.
104 City of Chi. v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 74 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
105 For thoughtful discussions of as-applied and facial challenges to exercises of
Congress’s Section 5 power, see Hartnett, supra note 100, and Gillian E. Metzger, R
Facial Challenges and Federalism, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 873 (2005).
106 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
107 Id. at 743 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601,
613 (1973)).
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facial analysis of legislative power challenges does not foreclose an as-
applied challenge when a facial challenge fails: “If the statute survives
[the facial] challenge, however, it stands to reason that the court may,
if asked, proceed to analyze whether the statute (constitutional on its
face) can be validly applied to the litigant.”108
In fact, this as-applied review, as envisioned in Justice Scalia’s
Hibbs dissent, could be described as state-specific as-applied review.
“In the context of § 5 prophylactic legislation applied against a State,”
Justice Scalia has argued, evaluating an as-applied challenge “would
entail examining whether the State has itself engaged in discrimina-
tion sufficient to support the exercise of Congress’s prophylactic
power.”109  A state, in this view, “will be entitled to assert that the mere
facts that (1) it is a State, and (2) some States are bad actors, is not
enough; it can demand that it be shown to have been acting in viola-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment.”110
So in Justice Scalia’s view, state-specific as-applied review is war-
ranted in some circumstances.  Why not in the context of Rules Ena-
bling Act challenges?  Part of the answer undoubtedly lies in Justice
Scalia’s view of the scope of Congress’s power under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment.  Another part of the answer, as I discuss in
Part III.C.3, lies in Justice Scalia’s view of the importance of uniform-
ity within a system of litigation procedure.
Justice Scalia should not be criticized merely because his
approaches to facial and as-applied review vary by context.  As com-
mentators have noted, it makes sense for the choice among facial and
as-applied approaches to vary depending on the nature of the doc-
trine under which the review proceeds.111  But it is useful to contem-
plate the effect of the choice among approaches.  In the context of




111 See, e.g., Matthew D. Adler, Rights Against Rules: The Moral Structure of American
Constitutional Law, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1, 127 (1998) (“[T]he appropriate view may well
depend on the constitutional clause or rule-validity schema at stake; on the strategic
incentives of actors who can secure facial, as opposed to partial invalidations of rules;
and on the existence of a statutory or regulatory severability clause for [rule] R (guid-
ing its revision in the event R is held unconstitutional).” (footnotes omitted));
Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 235, 294
(1994) (“[T]he proper approach to a constitutional case typically turns on the appli-
cable substantive constitutional doctrine and the institutional setting, not the classifi-
cation of a case as a facial or as-applied challenge.”); Metzger, supra note 105, at 888 R
(“[G]iven the role played by severability, the availability of facial challenges ultimately
turns on the substantive constitutional doctrines that govern in a particular area.”).
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permit a facial challenge or whether, instead, to require the challenge
to proceed on an as-applied basis.  In the context of that choice, it is
generally acknowledged that as-applied review is less intrusive than
facial review because a statute’s as-applied invalidation leaves the gov-
ernment free to continue to apply the statute under other, distin-
guishable, circumstances.112
The terms of the individual-constitutional-rights debate may be
unhelpful in contexts where the Court proposes to forbid as-applied
challenges and permit only facial challenges.  This choice—between
permitting only facial challenges or permitting both facial and as-
applied challenges—arises in the context of the Enabling Act.  In
addition, as I discuss in subpart III.D, there exists a similar debate over
the choice between facial and as-applied review in the context of the
adequate and independent state procedural ground doctrine.  In the
latter context, the question is whether a state procedural requirement
should be held adequate to bar U.S. Supreme Court review of a state
court judgment (or, similarly, adequate to bar federal habeas review).
As I previously noted, in that context
opposition to as-applied adequacy review serves the function of rais-
ing the stakes: If as-applied review is unavailable, then a state proce-
dural rule can be held inadequate only if the Court is willing to
hold that the state cannot use that procedural rule to bar considera-
tion of a federal-law contention under any circumstances—a stan-
dard likely to produce a finding of inadequacy only in the rarest of
cases.113
So too in the context of Enabling Act challenges: If a federal Rule
can be invalidated only on its face, and not as applied, then invalida-
tion is less likely to occur.114  In considering whether as-applied chal-
112 See Samuel Estreicher & John E. Sexton, A Managerial Theory of the Supreme
Court’s Responsibilities: An Empirical Study, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 681, 729 (1984).
113 Catherine T. Struve, Direct and Collateral Federal Court Review of the Adequacy of
State Procedural Rules, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 243, 254 (2003).  Edward Hartnett has sug-
gested that
[t]his feature of facial challenges may help to explain why the Roberts Court
has issued a series of unanimous rulings that lean heavily toward as-applied
challenges.  These cases cut across the broad swath of constitutional areas
involving the question of facial as opposed to as-applied challenges: Congres-
sional power under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment; substantive
due process protection for abortion; and First Amendment limitation on
campaign finance regulation.
Hartnett, supra note 100, at 1756–57. R
114 Cf. Hartnett, supra note 100, at 1754 (“[D]octrine that discourages (or com- R
pletely blocks) as-applied challenges can serve to reduce judicial findings of unconsti-
tutionality . . . .”).
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lenges should be permissible in litigation under the Enabling Act, it
makes sense to assess the relative roles of rulemaking and litigation in
promoting compliance with the Enabling Act limitations115—a topic I
take up in the next subpart—as well as the possible costs of as-applied
challenges—a topic I address in subpart III.C.
B. Possible Benefits
The rulemaking process provides a powerful tool for recognizing
and addressing ways in which a Rule might transgress the Enabling
Act’s substantive rights limitation.  But in rare instances, it may be the
case that a Rule’s effect on substantive rights under the law of a partic-
ular state becomes apparent only in the course of litigation after the
Rule’s promulgation.  If that were to happen, as-applied challenges in
the course of litigation could provide a useful way in which the effect
of the rule could be brought to light and addressed.
The Enabling Act process provides an opportunity for possible
substantive effects of a proposed rule amendment to be considered in
advance of the amendment’s adoption.  Participants in the rulemak-
ing process include state court judges and other members from
diverse geographic areas, thus increasing the chances that a proposed
amendment’s possible effects on state created substantive rights may
be discerned.  Moreover, the rulemaking process is an open one, and
the notice-and-comment procedure provides an opportunity for secur-
ing input from a wide variety of practitioners, judges, and academics
who may point out a proposal’s possible implications for substantive
rights (whether created by state or by federal law).
Participants in the rulemaking process are attentive to the Ena-
bling Act’s limits on rulemaking scope.116  Minutes of advisory com-
mittee meetings reflect discussion of the implications of those
limits.117  Committee members, on occasion, cite those limits as a rea-
115 Cf. Dorf, supra note 111, at 238 (“The proper disposition of a facial challenge R
is intimately bound up in questions of substantive constitutional law, institutional
competence, and statutory interpretation.”); Hartnett, supra note 100, at 1735 (“[A]n R
exploration of the comparative competence of courts regarding constitutional inter-
pretation should inform the judiciary’s approach to facial, as opposed to as-applied,
constitutional challenges.”).
116 My description of the rulemaking process focuses on that process as it has
stood since the late 1980s. See generally Catherine T. Struve, The Paradox of Delegation:
Interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1099, 1108–09 (2002)
(discussing the evolution of the rulemaking process).
117 See, e.g., Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules, Judicial Conf. of the U.S., Minutes of
the Meeting Apr. 19–20, 2007, at 20, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/
RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/CV04-2007-min.pdf (“It was asked whether it might
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son for their votes on a given proposal.118  And where a proposed rule
might be seen as coming close to the bounds set by the Enabling Act,
the proposal can be sent forward with a note flagging the issue.  For
example, when Rule 4(k) was amended to add a fallback provision
authorizing nationwide service in federal question cases, the proposed
rule was sent forward with a note raising the Enabling Act issue and
suggesting that if the proposed Rule 4(k)(2) were invalid it should be
severed from the other Rule 4(k) proposals:
Mindful of the constraints of the Rules Enabling Act, the Commit-
tee calls the attention of the Supreme Court and Congress to new
subdivision (k)(2). Should this limited extension of service be disap-
proved, the Committee nevertheless recommends adoption of the
balance of the rule, with subdivision (k)(1) becoming simply subdi-
vision (k). The Committee Notes would be revised to eliminate ref-
erences to subdivision (k)(2).119
These facets of the Enabling Act procedures support the Court’s
presumption in favor of the Rules’ validity.  But it is possible that, in
rare instances, a particular rule’s effect on substantive rights might
come to light only after the fact.  This might be true, for example, if
the legal context changed markedly, during the years after a rule’s
promulgation, in such a way that a given procedural practice acquired
a substantive rights valence that it previously had lacked.120  Or it
might be true because a rule’s effect on substantive rights became
noticeable only as the rule’s meaning was elaborated through its appli-
cation to individual cases.  Or the rule’s effect on substantive rights
under the law of a particular state—or on substantive rights under a
be suitable to grant summary judgment as a sanction but also provide for an award
against an attorney who fails to respond properly to compensate the summary-judg-
ment loser’s loss. But this possible substitute for a malpractice action may seem too
close to establishing a new substantive tort right to be comfortable under the Rules
Enabling Act.  It may be better to refrain from saying anything about this subject
either in rule text or Committee Note.”).
118 See, e.g., Advisory Comm. on Criminal Rules, Judicial Conf. of the U.S., Minutes
of the Meeting Apr. 17, 2007, at 14, available at http://www/uscourts.gov/uscourts/
RulesAndPolicies/Minutes/CRO4-2007-min.pdf  (noting that some members who
voted to table a proposal to amend Criminal Rule 29 did so in part because they
believed that “the proposed amendment is a substantive change that would, if
approved, violate the Rules Enabling Act and which should instead be handled by
Congress”).
119 FED. R. CIV. P. 4 committee note (1993).
120 See Burbank & Wolff, supra note 3, at 47 (“Over time, as thinking about law,
litigation, and civil law enforcement has evolved, so has our understanding of what it
means to have legal rights and what in the legal landscape—in addition to rules defin-
ing rights and duties—determines whether citizens will be able to fructify their legal
rights.”).
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particular federal statutory scheme—might not have become appar-
ent during the process by which that rule was adopted.  As a leading
treatise notes, the presumption in favor of a rule’s validity
is strongest when any incidental effects on substantive rights or poli-
cies are a readily foreseeable consequence of a clearly intended
application of a Rule or Rules.  Conversely, the presumption is
much weaker when the intended scope of a Rule is uncertain or
when a Rule is to be applied in unusual situations that might not
have been anticipated by the Advisory Committee, the Judicial Con-
ference, or the Supreme Court during the Rule’s formulation.121
When a rule’s previously unforeseen effect on substantive rights
surfaces after the rule’s adoption, as-applied validity review is not the
only way in which the effect might be addressed.  In some instances—
where the rule is susceptible to more than one interpretation—the
courts could instead apply an avoidance-based interpretive approach,
construing the rule to minimize its effects on substantive rights.
Indeed, the approach taken by the Shady Grove dissenters falls within
this genre.  And the Court has (with varying degrees of explicitness)
employed similar avoidance-based approaches122 to Civil Rule 59 in
Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc.123 to Civil Rule 23 in Amchem
Products, Inc. v. Windsor124 and Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.,125 to Civil Rule
121 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 60, § 4509, at 272 (citing Peter Westen R
& Jeffrey S. Lehman, Is There Life for Erie After the Death of Diversity?, 78 MICH. L. REV.
311, 364 (1980)).
122 Because my purpose here is merely to note the technique’s availability, I do
not pause to assess the degrees of success of the applications of that technique listed
in the text.
123 518 U.S. 415 (1996); see id. at 427 n.7 (“Federal courts have interpreted the
Federal Rules . . . with sensitivity to important state interests and regulatory poli-
cies.”); id. at 437 n.22 (concluding the Civil Rule 59 does not supply a standard for
determining whether damages are excessive, and citing with approval a leading
casebook’s observation that the Court “interpret[s] the federal rules to avoid conflict
with important state regulatory policies”).
124 521 U.S. 591 (1997); see id. at 612–13 (“Rule 23’s requirements must be inter-
preted in keeping with Article III constraints, and with the Rules Enabling Act, which
instructs that rules of procedure ‘shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive
right’” (citation omitted)); id. at 628–29 (concluding that “Rule 23, which must be
interpreted with fidelity to the Rules Enabling Act and applied with the interests of
absent class members in close view,” did not authorize the asbestos-claims global set-
tlement that had been approved by district court).
125 527 U.S. 815 (1999); see id. at 821 (holding that “a mandatory settlement class”
cannot be certified “on a limited fund theory under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23(b)(1)(B)” unless “the fund is limited by more than the agreement of the parties,
and has been allocated to claimants belonging within the class by a process addressing
any conflicting interests of class members”); id. at 845 (noting “tension between the
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41 in Semtek International Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp.,126 to Civil Rule 3
in Walker v. Armco Steel Corp.127—though, notoriously, not in West v.
Conrail128 (a federal question case)—to the predecessor to Civil Rule
23.1 in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.,129 and (less famously)
to Civil Rule 23.1 in Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox130 (a federal ques-
tion case).  But as the debate among the Justices in Shady Grove high-
lights, a key question in this enterprise is whether the rule in fact is
susceptible to more than one interpretation.  The potential for disa-
greement on this score makes it harder for litigants to predict whether
courts will in fact select an interpretation of a rule that avoids collision
limited fund class action’s pro rata distribution in equity and the rights of individual
tort victims at law” and concluding that “[e]ven if we assume that some such tension is
acceptable under the Rules Enabling Act, it is best kept within tolerable limits by
keeping limited fund practice under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) close to the practice preced-
ing its adoption”).
126 531 U.S. 497 (2001); see id. at 506 (holding that the conclusion that a judgment
is “on the merits” within the meaning of Civil Rule 41(b) merely bars reassertion of
the same claim in the same federal district court and does not govern the judgment’s
preclusive effects in other courts).
127 446 U.S. 740 (1980); see id. at 751 (“[I]n diversity actions . . . Rule 3 governs the
date from which various timing requirements of the Federal Rules begin to run, but
does not affect state statutes of limitations.” (footnote omitted)); id. at 752 n.14
(“Since we hold that Rule 3 does not apply, it is unnecessary for us to address the
second question posed by the Hanna analysis: whether Rule 3, if it applied, would be
outside the scope of the Rules Enabling Act or beyond the power of Congress under
the Constitution.”).
128 481 U.S. 35 (1987); see id. at 39 (holding that in a federal question case Civil
Rule 3 governs the commencement of the suit for statute of limitations purposes); id.
n.4  (purporting to distinguish Walker on the basis that “[r]espect for the State’s sub-
stantive decision that actual service is a component of the policies underlying the
statute of limitations requires that the service rule in a diversity suit ‘be considered
part and parcel of the statute of limitations,’” and asserting that “[t]his requirement,
naturally, does not apply to federal-question cases” (quoting Walker, 446 U.S. at 752)).
129 337 U.S. 541 (1949); see id. at 556 (reading the provisions in what was then
Civil Rule 23 to be compatible with the imposition in a diversity case of an additional
state-law prerequisite for a shareholder derivative suit).
130 464 U.S. 523 (1984); see id. at 542 (holding “that Rule 23.1 does not apply to an
action brought by a shareholder under § 36(b) of the Investment Company Act and
that the plaintiff in such a case need not first make a demand upon the fund’s direc-
tors before bringing suit”); id. at 532 n. 8 (noting that the Court’s holding—“that a
suit brought under § 36(b) of the Investment Company Act is not a ‘derivative action’
for purposes of Rule 23.1”—permitted the Court to avoid deciding “whether the Rule
itself, as a matter of federal procedure, makes demand on directors the predicate to a
proper derivative suit in federal courts or whether any such obligation must instead
be found in applicable substantive law.”).
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with assertedly substantive interests.131  And in cases where a rule can-
not feasibly be read to avoid an effect on substantive rights, this tech-
nique would not provide a substitute for as-applied review.
Avoidance-based interpretations by courts are not the only possi-
ble substitute for as-applied validity review.  A late-surfacing concern
with a rule’s application in a particular context could be brought to
the rulemakers as the basis for a proposal to amend the rule.  As I
note in subpart III.D, a variety of federal rules incorporate state prac-
tice, sometimes in contexts where the goal appears to have been to
avoid a collision with substantive interests.132  Similar carve-outs might
be adopted, in rare instances, to address concerns about a rule’s appli-
cation to particular sorts of substantive interests.  The rulemaking pro-
cess would be well suited to this enterprise, because of its ability to
commission studies that would inform decisionmaking with empirical
data, because of its opportunity for deliberative, multi-member con-
sideration, and because of the possibility that relevant information
could surface through the notice and comment process.
But though the rulemaking process provides a useful venue for
addressing such concerns, the question here is whether it should pro-
vide the only venue.  Permitting as-applied validity challenges to be
made in the course of litigation could provide a useful supplement to
the rulemaking process, by providing litigants with an incentive to
bring such challenges to light.133  We saw, for example, in section
II.C.2 that the rulemakers took account of Marshall (a case involving a
state-specific as-applied challenge) when amending what now is Civil
Rule 15(c)(1)(A).
As-applied validity challenges, then, could provide the courts with
a way to address validity concerns in instances where an avoidance-
131 The Court has not always selected the interpretation that would avoid potential
clashes with features of preexisting law that some have argued to have substantive
implications; the Court’s interpretation of Civil Rule 4 in Hanna and its interpretation
of Civil Rule 68 in Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1 (1985), provide counterexamples. See
generally Burbank & Wolff, supra note 3, at 34 (observing that in Marek “the Court
simply ignored the Enabling Act question that the operation of the existing version of
Rule 68 posed”); Clermont, supra note 3, at 1010 (noting the Court’s “vacillat[ion]”
concerning “how to read the Rules”).
132 Incorporating state law would not ordinarily address concerns about the scope
of rulemaking power in federal question cases.  A possible variant is to adopt the
practices attached to whatever body of substantive law governs the relevant claim. See,
e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c)(1)(A); id. R. 54(d)(2)(A).
133 In this respect, one might draw a very loose analogy to the respective roles of
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and tort litigation in promoting drug
safety: opponents of broad FDA preemption point out that tort litigation concerning
drug safety can serve as an important supplement to FDA postmarketing surveillance.
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based interpretive technique is unavailable.  In addition, such chal-
lenges might in some cases bring to light information that could
inform the rulemaking process.  And these benefits might be particu-
larly salient in the case of state-specific as-applied review because such
review would permit courts to take account of idiosyncrasies in the law
of a particular state that might have escaped notice during the process
by which the relevant rule was promulgated.
One might, of course, respond that an idiosyncratic state system
deserves less solicitude and that the consideration of state interests
should focus only on a generalized view of such interests.  To the
extent that such a response is driven by the costs of state-specific con-
sideration, I can understand the concern, and I address it in subpart
III.C.  But we should balance against that concern the values served by
considering, not just an Esperanto-style generic portrait of state sub-
stantive interests, but also the way in which a particular state has con-
structed its system of substantive rights.  One of the values of
federalism is, in fact, the possibility of interstate variation; other things
being equal, it would seem undesirable to slight a state’s mode of con-
figuring its substantive law just because that state takes an atypical
approach to the matter.134  State-specific consideration of substantive
interests, thus, makes sense if it can be accomplished without impos-
ing undue costs.
Accordingly, I turn in the next part to the potential costs of as-
applied challenges, and—in particular—state-specific as-applied
challenges.
134 In a recent article, Stephen Burbank and Tobias Wolff argue that Justice
Scalia’s “insistence on a test for validity that does not depend on idiosyncratic aspects
of state law rings true for a statute that was designed primarily to allocate federal
lawmaking power ex ante rather than to protect policy choices (let alone only state
law policies) ex post.”  Burbank & Wolff, supra note 3, at 51.  But Professors Burbank
and Wolff would leave room for the Enabling Act analysis to take account of formerly
idiosyncratic aspects of state law if those aspects gain wider acceptance: “Laws that are
idiosyncratic in one historical period, however, may become the norm in another.”
Id.  If—as seems reasonable—that sort of evolution properly forms a part of the Ena-
bling Act validity analysis, then the analysis seems to range beyond considerations that
would govern ex ante allocations of rulemaking power.
An alternative objection to my argument might be that it is awkward to invoke
the values of federalism when interpreting a statute that was drafted primarily to
police separation-of-powers boundaries.  But my argument takes as a given that the
body of Enabling Act doctrine properly takes into account not only separation of
powers concerns but also (in cases where state law supplies the rules of decision)
federalism concerns.
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C. Possible Costs
Permitting as-applied review has costs.  It injects uncertainty into
litigation, because even a rule that has been upheld as facially valid
might be subject to challenge in its application to the particular case.
And state-specific as-applied review imposes additional burdens,
because of the challenges of discerning how a particular state provi-
sion relates to that state’s body of substantive law, and because state-
specific as-applied invalidation of a federal rule would produce inter-
state variation in the application of the national rules.
1. Uncertainty
If facially valid rules are subject to challenge in a given case, liti-
gants may be uncertain as to the procedure that will govern their dis-
pute.  Such uncertainty can raise the cost of litigation if litigants
research and litigate the question of a rule’s validity as applied.  These
costs arise from both sub-rule as-applied review and state-specific as-
applied review, because both sorts of as-applied review create the pos-
sibility that a rule might not be applied to a given dispute.  In assess-
ing these costs, it is important to note that as-applied review is not the
only possible source of such uncertainty; because the Court has not
always been consistent in its interpretive approach,135 in some cases
litigants will confront uncertainty as to whether a given Rule will or
will not be interpreted to govern the relevant question.
One of the virtues of Justice Stevens’s proposed approach—
which would require a particularly strong showing before concluding
that a rule is invalid as applied—is that it lowers the costs of uncer-
tainty, because litigants could rely on the application of the national
rules except in the unusual case where there is strong evidence that
the rule’s application impinges on a substantive right.
2. Difficulty
In addition to the costs of uncertainty, state-specific as-applied
review imposes costs on litigants and courts by requiring them to
assess the role that a particular state practice plays within that state’s
system of substantive rights.  To this concern one might reply, as Jus-
tice Stevens did, that ease of administration should not be the control-
ling factor in determining the features of validity review under the
Enabling Act.136  As the Court observed when rejecting a lower court’s
135 See supra note 131 and accompanying text. R
136 See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431,
1454 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The question, therefore, is not what rule we
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refusal to exercise its jurisdiction in a case involving unsettled ques-
tions of state law, “[t]he diversity jurisdiction was not conferred for
the benefit of the federal courts or to serve their convenience.”137  But
though Justice Stevens rejected the notion that administrability con-
cerns should foreclose as-applied review, his preferred test does
respond to such concerns—not by forbidding as-applied review, but
by raising the burden of proof for the litigant seeking as-applied
invalidation.
Examining state law may pose various difficulties.  There is the
challenge of mastering a body of unfamiliar state law.  That particular
challenge may be most acute for Justices on the Supreme Court, for
whom the task could entail assessing the law of any of fifty states.
Court of appeals judges are more likely to have some familiarity with
the laws of states within their circuit; and district judges are more
likely still to be acquainted with the law of the state in which they
sit.138
In addition to mastering unfamiliar subject matter, a federal
court examining the valence of a state statute would also need (under
a traditional approach) to ascertain and apply the interpretive meth-
odology used by the courts of that state.  Here, though, we should
note that the majority opinion in Shady Grove appeared to endorse a
departure from that traditional approach.  Responding to the dis-
think would be easiest on federal courts.  The question is what rule Congress
established.”).
137 Meredith v. City of Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 234 (1943).  In Meredith the
Court rejected a lower federal court’s refusal “to exercise its jurisdiction on the
ground that decision of the case on the merits turned on questions of Florida consti-
tutional and statutory law which the decisions of the Florida courts had left in a state
of uncertainty.” Id. at 229.
138 That the task of interpreting and applying a particular state’s law may often be
easier for a lower court judge than for judges on the court above does not mean that
the lower court’s resolution of the question receives deference on appeal. See Salve
Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 239–40 (1991) (mandating “that courts of
appeals review the state-law determinations of district courts de novo”).  But it does
mean that a higher court’s analysis will often be informed by the lower court’s read-
ing of state law.  As the Court earlier stated:
[O]rdinarily we accept and therefore do not review, save in exceptional
cases, the considered determination of questions of state law by the interme-
diate federal appellate courts.  When we are called upon to decide them, the
expression of the views of the judges of those courts, who are familiar with
the intricacies and trends of local law and practice, if not indispensable, is at
least a highly desirable and important aid to our determination of state law
questions.
Huddleston v. Dwyer, 322 U.S. 232, 237 (1944) (citing Ruhlin v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 304
U.S. 202, 206–07 (1937)).
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sent’s contention that section 901(b)’s bar on class suits seeking statu-
tory damages was designed to serve a substantive purpose—namely,
limiting the total exposure of defendants—the majority first ques-
tioned the dissent’s reading of section 901(b)’s legislative history.  But
more basically, the majority rejected the notion that section 901(b)
should be read purposively:
[E]ven accepting the dissent’s account of the Legislature’s objective
at face value, it cannot override the statute’s clear text.  Even if its
aim is to restrict the remedy a plaintiff can obtain, § 901(b) achieves
that end by limiting a plaintiff’s power to maintain a class action.
The manner in which the law “could have been written,” has no
bearing; what matters is the law the Legislature did enact.  We can-
not rewrite that to reflect our perception of legislative purpose.139
In this view, a textualist approach to interpreting the state statute
would serve two interests—promoting nationally uniform application
of the federal Rules and avoiding undue burdens on federal judges:
The dissent’s approach of determining whether state and fed-
eral rules conflict based on the subjective intentions of the state leg-
islature is an enterprise destined to produce “confusion worse
confounded.”  It would mean, to begin with, that one State’s statute
could survive pre-emption (and accordingly affect the procedures in
federal court) while another State’s identical law would not, merely
because its authors had different aspirations.  It would also mean
that district courts would have to discern, in every diversity case, the
purpose behind any putatively pre-empted state procedural rule,
even if its text squarely conflicts with federal law.  That task will
often prove arduous.140
The majority’s argument against purposive interpretation of state
law is striking,141 both because its justifications are open to question
139 Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1440 (citation omitted) (quoting id. at 1472 (Gins-
burg, J., dissenting)).
140 Id. at 1440–41 (citations omitted) (quoting Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S.
1, 14 (1941)).
141 The Shady Grove Court offered no reason (other than its preference for textual-
ism) for rejecting the views of New York’s highest court concerning the purposes of
Section 901(b).  In Sperry v. Crompton Corp., 863 N.E.2d 1012 (N.Y. 2007), the New
York Court of Appeals had recently stated that the legislature, in enacting section
901(b), was “[r]esponding to” concerns “that recoveries beyond actual damages could
lead to excessively harsh results, particularly where large numbers of plaintiffs were
involved” and “that there was no need to permit class actions in order to encourage
litigation by aggregating damages when statutory penalties and minimum measures of
recovery provided an aggrieved party with a sufficient economic incentive to pursue a
claim.” Id. at 1015; see also id. at 1017 (“[B]y including the penalty exception in CPLR
901(b), the Legislature declined to make class actions available where individual
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and because its conclusion runs counter to a long tradition of defer-
ring to a state’s highest court on the content of state law.142  Prefer-
ring a textualist reading of all state statutes that may come into play
during the course of an Erie analysis may lead to greater nationwide
uniformity in result (though this is not self-evident).143  To the extent
that this is so, I take up in section III.D.1 the system’s ability to tolerate
some marginal decrease in the uniform application of the Rules.  As
to the question of workload, a textualist reading, it is true, provides an
analytical shortcut, but one that the Court has traditionally eschewed.
Under a traditional approach, the choice of methodology for
interpreting a state statute itself presents a question of state law on
which the views of the state’s highest court are determinative.144  The
basic premise that “state law is what the state courts say it is”145 extends
to state statutory law,146 and encompasses the notion that the state
court’s own choice of methodology should govern the interpretation
plaintiffs were afforded sufficient economic encouragement to institute actions
(through statutory provisions awarding something beyond or unrelated to actual dam-
ages), unless a statute expressly authorized the option of class action status.”).  The
Shady Grove majority, however, gave little consideration to this view, mentioning Sperry
only with an oddly generic reference to “a state court’s statement” concerning the
process of section 901(b)’s enactment. See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1440; see also
Joseph P. Bauer, Shedding Light on Shady Grove: Further Reflections on the Erie Doctrine
from a Conflicts Perspective, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 939, 955 (2011) (noting Justice
Scalia’s “singular adoption of a federal standard to characterize the state law” in Shady
Grove); Burbank & Wolff, supra note 3, at 70 (noting that Sperry provided “controlling R
statements by New York’s highest court, which define CPLR § 901(b) as an integral
component of the state’s policies on penalty liability”).
142 See, e.g., Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911, 916 (1997) (“Neither this Court nor
any other federal tribunal has any authority to place a construction on a state statute
different from the one rendered by the highest court of the State.  This proposition,
fundamental to our system of federalism, is applicable to procedural as well as sub-
stantive rules.” (citation omitted)).
143 The uniformity-based argument for a textualist approach to the interpretation
of state statutes assumes that there will be more variety in the purposes underlying
state statutes (on a given subject) than in the texts of state statutes.  It is, however,
possible to imagine a scenario in which textually disparate statutes could be grouped
into fewer categories when analyzed according to their basic purposes than when ana-
lyzed according to the particularities of their texts.
144 For a discussion of interpretive methods employed by the New York Court of
Appeals, see Eric Lane, How to Read a Statute in New York: A Response to Judge Kaye and
Some More, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 85 (1999).
145 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 YALE L.J. 853, 861
(1991).
146 See, e.g., Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 514 (1948) (“The interpretation by
the Court of Appeals puts these words in the statute as definitely as if it had been so
amended by the legislature.”); Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 317 (1926) (“The
Supreme Court of the State having held that the two statutes must be taken together
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of a state statute.  Thus, for example, when rejecting a litigant’s propo-
sal to discard a state high court’s interpretation of a state statute in
favor of the statute’s “literal import,” the Court has characterized as
“too well settled to permit of question” the principle “that this Court
not only accepts but is bound by the construction given to state stat-
utes by the state courts.”147  The explanation given by the Court for
deferring to a state high court’s ruling on statutory interpretation and
severability when considering a constitutional challenge to a state stat-
ute seems apposite here as well:
It is well settled that in cases of this kind the interpretation
placed by the highest court of the State upon its statutes is conclu-
sive here.  We accept the construction given to a state statute by that
court.  Nor is it material that the state court ascertains the meaning
and scope of the statute as well as its validity by pursuing a different
rule of construction from what we recognize.148
All of this is designed to acknowledge that discerning the role
played by a state procedural provision within the state’s body of sub-
stantive law is a challenging business—often more challenging than
the similar task that arises when the substantive rights at issue are cre-
ated by federal rather than state law.  But the challenge is not insur-
mountable; the federal courts have developed techniques for dealing
with difficult state-law questions, and those techniques could be
applied in this context as well.149
3. Disuniformity
Even more than uncertainty and difficulty, the aspect of state-spe-
cific as-applied review that most seemed to trouble Justice Scalia in
Shady Grove was the prospect that such review threatens the geographi-
cally uniform application of the federal rules.
Like the difficulty objection, the disuniformity objection applies
to state-specific as-applied review with much greater force than it does
to sub-rule as-applied review.  Sub-rule as-applied review produces dis-
uniformity in the sense that a rule does not apply uniformly to all
situations; thus, for example, if Schlagenhauf’s objection had pre-
in determining the penalty intended[,] we must accept that conclusion as if written
into the statutes themselves.”).
147 Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Bd. of R.R. Comm’rs of Mont., 332 U.S. 495,
499–500 (1947), overruled on other grounds by Amer. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. Scheiner,
483 U.S. 266, 296 n.26 (1987).
148 Smiley v. Kansas, 196 U.S. 447, 455 (1905) (citing St. Louis, Iron Mountain &
S. Ry. Co. v. Paul, 173 U.S. 404, 408 (1899)).
149 Cf., e.g., Burbank & Wolff, supra note 3, at 68 n.211 (advocating more frequent
use of the option of certifying state law questions to state courts).
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vailed, Rule 35 would authorize courts to subject plaintiffs but not
defendants to physical and mental examinations.  This sort of dis-
uniformity is not insignificant.  When we consider that the rules have
been designed in many instances to function as a unified whole, we
can see that in some instances invalidating one rule as applied to a
given case might disrupt the functioning of other rules in that same
case.  Such a concern arises with respect to both sub-rule as-applied
review and state-specific as-applied review, and this concern would jus-
tify considering—when deciding whether to invalidate a rule as
applied to a given situation—whether the invalidation of that particu-
lar rule would disrupt the operation of other federal rules.150
But sub-rule as-applied review produces no geographic dis-
uniformity: If the Court had agreed with Schlagenhauf, Rule 35 dis-
covery would have been unavailable from defendants throughout the
country.  State-specific as-applied review, by contrast, does pose the
prospect that the national rules would apply differently in different
states.  After tackling the difficult task of discerning the role that a
given practice played in the law of, say, New Hampshire, a federal
court might conclude that the practice was part and parcel of New
Hampshire’s definition of substantive rights and, on that ground,
might refuse to apply a conflicting federal Rule in cases governed by
New Hampshire law.  Yet a federal court adjudicating a claim under
Nevada law and contemplating a superficially similar practice in
Nevada procedure—after examining the practice’s role in Nevada
state law—might conclude that the Nevada practice is not an integral
part of Nevada’s definition of substantive rights and, thus, might
reject any as-applied validity challenge to the conflicting federal Rule.
D. Tolerating Disuniformity
We saw in the preceding section that state-specific as-applied
review of the validity of a federal rule can lead to interstate variation
in the application of federal rules.  The prospect of such state-to-state
variation formed a central part of Justice Scalia’s objection, in Shady
Grove, to state-specific as-applied review.151  It thus is worthwhile to
150 See, e.g., WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 60, § 4509, at 283 (arguing that R
in evaluating whether to invalidate the pre-1991 Rule 15(c) as applied to cases in
which state law would permit relation back but Rule 15(c) would not, it made sense to
consider the fact that it was unlikely “that suspension of the notice requirement in
occasional cases would have a ripple effect and frustrate the objectives and applica-
tion of other Civil Rules governing pleadings, joinder of parties and claims, and
discovery”).
151 Justice Scalia has not always subscribed to the view that permitting the applica-
tion of a federal procedural provision to depend on the content of state law would
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\86-3\NDL305.txt unknown Seq: 40 11-AUG-11 13:11
1220 notre dame law review [vol. 86:3
assess whether the introduction of interstate variation (as a result of
state-specific as-applied review) would fundamentally alter the way in
which the national rules currently function; I undertake that analysis
in section III.D.1.  It also seems useful to consider, for purposes of
comparison, the degree to which the federal system requires state
courts to vary their procedures when adjudicating federal claims or
issues; I address that question in section III.D.2.
1. Federal Court Examples
Those who put in place the system of Federal Rules undoubtedly
sought to serve the purpose of national uniformity.  Elsewhere in this
issue, Professor Bauer notes the values served by promoting
uniformity:
[U]niformity helps the parties, attorneys and judges know what the
rules are.  Uniformity in turn also leads to greater ease of adminis-
tration of the judicial process; federal courts will have to look to
fewer sources for resolving controverted issues, and they will be
sources with which the courts are more familiar.152
The sort of state-specific as-applied review contemplated in this Article
does run counter to those values.  As Stephen Burbank has argued,
“neither uniformity nor simplicity is well served by a rulemaking char-
ter that sanctions Federal Rules valid in one state and not in another,
here today, gone tomorrow.”153
But even if we leave aside the question of state-specific as-applied
review, the goal of uniformity has hardly been achieved across the
board.  The Rules themselves enable interstate variation both by
incorporating state law and by granting substantial discretion to dis-
lead to chaos.  In Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22 (1988), Justice
Scalia argued in dissent that a forum-selection clause should have no weight in a
transfer-of-venue analysis under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) if the forum-selection clause
would be void under the law applied by the state courts in the state in which the
transferor court sat.  Justice Scalia asserted:
Contrary to the opinion of the Court there is nothing unusual about having
“the applicability of a federal statute depend on the content of state law.”
We have recognized that precisely this is required when the application of
the federal statute depends, as here, on resolution of an underlying issue
that is fundamentally one of state law.
Stewart Org., Inc., 487 U.S. at 35 n.* (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Comm’r v. Estate of
Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 457, 464–65 (1967)).
152 Bauer, supra note 141, at 963.  Having noted those values, Professor Bauer con- R
cludes that, under the circumstances treated in Shady Grove, New York’s interest in the
application of section 901(b) outweighed the federal interest in uniformity. See id. at
966.
153 Burbank, supra note 8, at 1188. R
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trict judges.  Local federal court rules add further variation.  And as to
Erie questions where no federal statute or rule governs, the applicable
analysis—and especially the Byrd154 balancing test—can incorporate
state-specific consideration of a state practice’s role in the state’s sys-
tem of substantive rights.  As Professor Ides points out, a modest
amount of disuniformity resulting from rare instances of state-specific
as-applied review would not markedly alter this landscape.155
a. Rules that Incorporate State Law
A number of Civil Rules contain one or more provisions that
explicitly incorporate state law.  Some rules incorporate state law as an
alternative, effectively expanding the options available to a litigant.156
Others incorporate state law as the sole governing law.157  Either way,
the incorporation of state law produces interstate variation in the
operation of the federal Rules.  Incorporation may occur with respect
to topics that “involve strong local interests, little need for uniformity
among federal courts, or difficulty in defining a uniform federal prac-
154 Byrd v. Blue Ridge Electric Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
155 See Ides, supra note 5, at 1064 (“The occasional state law trumping of a Federal
Rule” under Justice Stevens’s proposed as-applied test “certainly does not amount to
anything like chaos”).
156 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 4(e)(1) (option of following service procedure of state
where the summons is served or where the federal court sits); id. R. 4(j)(2)(B)
(option of following state law for serving summons on a “state-created governmental
organization”); id. R. 27(a)(4) (permitting use of deposition to perpetuate testimony
“if the deposition either was taken under these rules or, although not so taken, would
be admissible in evidence in the courts of the state where it was taken”); id. R.
28(a)(1)(A) (deposition to be taken before “an officer authorized to administer oaths
either by federal law or by the law in the place of examination”); id. R. 45(b)(2)(C)
(permitting service of subpoena throughout state in which issuing court sits to the
extent that state statute or rule would permit service); id. R. 69(a)(2) (permitting use
of state discovery procedure in aid of judgment or execution).  Civil Rule
4(k)(1)(A)—providing for the exercise of personal jurisdiction under circumstances
where a state court of general subject matter jurisdiction could take personal jurisdic-
tion—could be seen as falling in this category; but for many types of claims, Rule
4(k)(1)(A) is not an alternative but rather the only option for establishing in per-
sonam jurisdiction. See id. R. 4(n)(2) (option, in specified circumstances, of using
state attachment procedures to establish in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction).
157 See, e.g., id. R. 4(g) (service on minor or incompetent must comply with state
law in the state of service); id. R. 17(b) (providing in most instances that capacity to
sue is determined by state law, and specifying choice of state law); id. R. 54(d)(2)(A)
(“A claim for attorney’s fees and related nontaxable expenses must be made by
motion unless the substantive law requires those fees to be proved at trial as an ele-
ment of damages.”); id. R. 62(f) (“If a judgment is a lien on the judgment debtor’s
property under the law of the state where the court is located, the judgment debtor is
entitled to the same stay of execution the state court would give.”).
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tice that integrates effectively with local practice.”158  Strong local
interests, for example, presumably influenced the development of
Civil Rules 15, 71.1, 62, 64, and 69.
We have already seen one notable example of this phenomenon.
Rule 15(c)(1)(A) provides that “[a]n amendment to a pleading
relates back to the date of the original pleading when . . . the law that
provides the applicable statute of limitations allows relation back.”159
The 1991 Committee Note to what is now Rule 15(c)(1)(A) explains
that “[w]hatever may be the controlling body of limitations law, if that
law affords a more forgiving principle of relation back than the one
provided in this rule, it should be available to save the claim.”160  As
noted in section III.C.2, the 1991 amendments rejected a broadly pre-
emptive reading of Rule 15(c) and instead codified the rule of Mar-
shall—a lower court decision that, taking an as-applied approach, had
refused to apply Rule 15(c)’s more restrictive relation-back provision
in a case where state law permitted relation back.161
Another, considerably more obscure, example is found in Civil
Rule 71.1, which sets the procedures for federal court actions “to con-
demn real and personal property by eminent domain.”162  Rule
71.1(k) provides: “This rule governs an action involving eminent
domain under state law. But if state law provides for trying an issue by
jury—or for trying the issue of compensation by jury or commission or
both—that law governs.”163  Rule 71.1 (originally known as Rule 71A)
first took effect in 1951.  A report accompanying original Rule 71A
explained that the drafters of the initial set of Civil Rules excluded
trial-level condemnation proceedings from the ambit of those Rules in
part because the Department of Justice asserted “that it preferred to
have government condemnations conducted by local attorneys famil-
iar with the state practice . . . [and] that it preferred to work under the
Conformity Act without a uniform rule of procedure.”164  But with the
wartime growth in the number of condemnation proceedings, the
158 Id. R. 81(d)(1) committee note (2009).  This committee note explains the rea-
sons for including federal commonwealths and territories within the definition of
“state” for purposes of the Civil Rules—reasons, the note states, that parallel “the
reasons that counsel incorporation of state practice.” Id.
159 Id. R. 15(c)(1)(A).
160 Id. committee note (1991).
161 See supra notes 79–81 and accompanying text. R
162 FED. R. CIV. P. 71.1(a).
163 Id. R. 71.1(k).
164 Id. R. 71.1(a) original report in advisory committee’s note.
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report recounted, support arose for a uniform federal condemnation
procedure.165
Rule 71A may have regularized many aspects of federal condem-
nation proceedings, but on one central issue—namely, who should
decide the amount of compensation for the condemned property—
the rule made only a weak attempt at uniformity.  In condemnation
proceedings brought by the federal government, Rule 71A set a
default principle—that a party could demand a jury—but made two
exceptions.  First, if a federal statute governing the condemnation
proceeding created a special tribunal, that tribunal was to decide the
issue of just compensation.  Second, the court was given discretion to
appoint a three member commission to determine the question of
just compensation if it deemed a commission appropriate “because of
the character, location, or quantity of the property to be condemned,
or for other reasons in the interest of justice.”166  Acknowledging
explicitly that the grant of such discretion could produce interstate
variation, a supplementary report accompanying the original Rule
noted that the discretionary analysis could take into account, inter
alia, “local preference or habit.”167
On the question of who should decide just compensation in con-
demnation proceedings brought by states, the Rule’s deference to
local procedure was absolute.  Noting that state condemnation pro-
ceedings might in rare instances be removed to federal court, the
original report had proposed that in such cases “[a]ny condition
affecting the substantial right of a litigant attached by state law is to be
observed and enforced.”168  But after further consideration, the Com-
mittee decided that determining whether the choice of decisionmaker
constituted such a condition would pose a “troublesome question,”
and the Committee decided instead to offer the Supreme Court two
alternative drafts, each of which took more specific positions.169  One
alternative would have sought to preempt any state provision that
165 See id.
166 Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Governing Condemnation
Cases in the District Courts of the United States, 11 F.R.D. 213, 217 (1951) (Original
Rule 71 A(h)).
167 Id. at 222.
168 Id. at 243.  Specifically, the 1948 draft of Rule 71A(k) provided:
If the action involves the exercise of the power of eminent domain under
the law of a state, the practice herein prescribed may be altered to the extent
necessary to observe and enforce any condition affecting the substantial
rights of a litigant attached by the state law to the exercise of the state’s
power of eminent domain.
Id. at 226.
169 Id. at 227.
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called for the use of both a jury and a commission, but would have
permitted a party to demand a jury when state law would provide
one.170  The other alternative—the one that the Supreme Court ulti-
mately adopted and that remains in the Rule to this day—simply
accepts the state law as to the tribunals to fix compensation, and in
that respect leaves the parties in precisely the same situation as if
the case were pending in a state court, including the use of a com-
mission with appeal to a jury, if the state law so provides.171
This choice, the supplemental report observed, “has the effect of
avoiding any question as to whether the decisions in Erie R. Co. v.
Tompkins and later cases have application to a situation of this
kind.”172
Civil Rule 64’s treatment of provisional remedies,173 Civil Rule
69’s treatment of the execution of judgments,174 and Civil Rule 62(f)’s
provision for stays of execution175 provide additional instances where
the rules incorporate state procedure in what had, historically, been
areas of strong state interest.176  Stephen Burbank has noted that
Rules 64 and 69
were (and are) exceptional in opting for conformity to state law in
preference to uniform federal regulation. They took that form
because, notwithstanding the desire of some members of the Advi-
sory Committee to subject those matters, or some of them, to uni-




173 See FED. R. CIV. P. 64(a) (“At the commencement of and throughout an action,
every remedy is available that, under the law of the state where the court is located,
provides for seizing a person or property to secure satisfaction of the potential judg-
ment. But a federal statute governs to the extent it applies.”).
174 Rule 69(a)(1) provides:
A money judgment is enforced by a writ of execution, unless the court
directs otherwise.  The procedure on execution—and in proceedings sup-
plementary to and in aid of judgment or execution—must accord with the
procedure of the state where the court is located, but a federal statute gov-
erns to the extent it applies.
Id. R. 69(a)(1).
175 Rule 62(f) provides: “If a judgment is a lien on the judgment debtor’s property
under the law of the state where the court is located, the judgment debtor is entitled
to the same stay of execution the state court would give.” Id. R. 62(f).
176 The original committee notes to both rules pointed out that the rules carried
on the prior statutory policy of conformity to state practice, except that the new Rules
prescribed dynamic conformity, unlike the static conformity (subject to updating by
rule) that had previously been mandated by statute for preliminary and final
remedies.
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would be controversial and would perhaps exceed the limits of the
Court’s power.177
As Professor Burbank has explained, the nineteenth century his-
tory of provisions concerning the enforcement of judgments shows
that the area was one of intense interest to the states, a number of
which adopted laws designed to protect debtors during times of eco-
nomic hardship.178  By the late nineteenth century, he has observed,
“it must have been clear that both provisional and final remedies
involved questions of property law that held the potential consequen-
tially to affect the balance of power between creditors and debtors, as
well as the balance of power between the states and the federal
courts.”179
b. Rules that Grant Discretion
The federal Rules, then, explicitly incorporate state law in several
places.  More subtly, implicit incorporation may occur as a result of
the rules’ conferral of judicial discretion.  As the rulemakers noted
with respect to Civil Rule 71A, granting discretion to the district court
carries with it the possibility that the exercise of that discretion may
vary by locale.  And the Civil Rules, of course, embody numerous
grants of discretion.  To take just one example, Richard Nagareda
argues in this issue that the New York state substantive policy concerns
that failed to carry the day in Shady Grove may yet influence a court’s
analysis under Civil Rule 23(b)(3) of whether a class action is “supe-
rior” to other methods of adjudication.180
As Stephen Burbank has noted, the federal Rules are “only super-
ficially uniform and trans-substantive.”181  Stephen Subrin has likewise
177 Stephen B. Burbank, The Bitter with the Sweet: Tradition, History, and Limitations
on Federal Judicial Power—A Case Study, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1291, 1331 (2000); see
also Burbank, supra note 8, at 1145–47.  As Professor Burbank points out, if one views R
the Enabling Act limitations on the scope of rulemaking authority as driven by separa-
tion of powers concerns rather than federalism concerns, then a choice to incorpo-
rate state practice does not moot all questions of rulemaking power. See id. at 1147.
178 See Burbank, supra note 177, at 1324–28 (discussing, inter alia, Wayman v. R
Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1 (1825), and the events that led to the enactment of
the Process Act of 1828).
179 Id. at 1330.
180 See Richard A. Nagareda, The Litigation-Arbitration Dichotomy Meets the Class
Action, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1069, 1085 (2011) (“[S]ection 901(b) properly
informs the discretionary judicial inquiry into superiority under Rule 23(b)(3),
adding to the doubts about superiority that would arise even without such a state law
stricture.”).
181 Stephen B. Burbank, Of Rules and Discretion: The Supreme Court, Federal Rules and
Common Law, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 693, 716 (1998).
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pointed out that “[p]rocedural rules, as flexible and as judge-empow-
ering as the Federal Rules, have always implied non-uniformity of
treatment, with or without local rules.”182  The latter, of course, add a
further dimension of geographic variation, to which I turn in the next
section.
c. Local Federal Rules
Each set of national federal rules contemplates the adoption of
local rules that are “consistent with—but not duplicative of—Acts of
Congress and” any relevant set of national rules.183  The national rules
explicitly invite local rulemaking on a variety of topics,184 but local
rules are not limited to those areas.  They address not merely mun-
dane aspects of court management but also such pivotal phases of liti-
gation as summary judgment.  For example, a recent study of local
rules on the latter subject found thirty-four districts with local rules
requiring a movant to list in numbered paragraphs the material facts
not in dispute and twenty districts imposing that requirement “on
both the movant and respondent.”185
Not surprisingly, critics of the upsurge in local rules have argued
that such rules threaten the national uniformity of federal proce-
182 Stephen N. Subrin, Federal Rules, Local Rules, and State Rules: Uniformity, Diver-
gence, and Emerging Procedural Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1999, 2047–48 (1989).
183 FED. R. BANKR. P. 9029(a)(1); FED. R. CRIM. P. 57(a)(1); see also FED. R. CIV. P.
83(a)(1) (“A local rule must be consistent with—but not duplicate—federal statutes
and rules adopted under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072 and 2075 . . . .”).  28 U.S.C. § 2071(a)
provides that “[t]he Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may
from time to time prescribe rules for the conduct of their business.  Such rules shall
be consistent with Acts of Congress and rules of practice and procedure prescribed
under section 2072 of this title.”  28 U.S.C. § 2071(a) (2006).  The Bankruptcy Rules
add the further requirement that local rules not “prohibit or limit the use of the
Official Forms.” FED. R. BANKR. P. 9029(a)(1).
184 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 5(b)(3), (d)(3) (electronic service and filing); id. R.
6(a)(4) (definition of “last day” for purposes of computing time); id. R. 16(b)(1)
(exemption of categories of actions from scheduling orders); id. R. 26(b)(2)(A) (lim-
its on requests for admission); id. R. 26(f)(4) (timing of parties’ conference and
report regarding discovery plan); id. R. 40 (systems for scheduling trials); id. R.
54(d)(2)(D) (procedures for determining attorney’s fees); id. R. 56(c) (timing of
summary judgment motion); id. R. 66 (procedure for administration of estate by
receiver); id. R. 77(c)(1) (Saturday and holiday hours for clerk’s office); id. R.
81(a)(5) (proceedings regarding subpoenas issued by federal entities under federal
statute).
185 JOE CECIL & GEORGE CORT, REPORT ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT PRACTICE ACROSS
DISTRICTS WITH VARIATIONS IN LOCAL RULES 1 & app. A (2008), available at http://
www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/sujulrs2.pdf.
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dure.186  Thus, for example, Barry Friedman and Erwin Chemerinsky
have argued that procedural uniformity reduces inter-district variation
in litigation cost and outcomes, reduces forum shopping and litiga-
tion over forum choice, increases efficiency and reduces the likeli-
hood of attorney error.187  I will not attempt here to suggest an
optimal level of, and set of topics for, local federal court rulemaking.
I will simply note that the myriad local rules dealing with topics from
the trivial to the vital suggest that the federal court system already
tolerates a considerable amount of interstate and even intrastate
variation.188
d. Erie Questions Not Controlled by a Federal Provision
When no provision of federal non-judge-made law governs, fed-
eral courts sitting in diversity will in some cases apply state procedures
that vary geographically.  In this sense, federal practice in diversity
cases includes some degree of interstate disuniformity.  In addition, as
I discuss in this subsection, some courts have interpreted Byrd v. Blue
Ridge Electric Cooperative, Inc.189 in a way that leads them to engage in a
balancing analysis that takes account of the specific state interests
served by a given state practice.  In offering this as an additional exam-
ple of state-specific variation in federal practice, I should note that the
precise contours of the analysis that applies in the absence of a gov-
erning federal constitutional, statutory or Rule provision are con-
tested.  In particular, the nature and vitality of the analysis in Byrd are
subject to dispute. My goal in this subsection is not to settle the ques-
tion of Byrd’s meaning and continued applicability, but rather to note
that some courts interpret Byrd to entail a balancing of state and fed-
eral interests that encompasses consideration of the role that a partic-
ular state practice plays within the relevant state’s substantive law.
In diversity cases where no federal constitutional provision, stat-
ute, or Rule governs a procedural question, a federal court faced with
the choice between state and federal practices that would lead to
186 See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky & Barry Friedman, The Fragmentation of the Federal
Rules, 46 MERCER L. REV. 757, 763 (1995) (“[S]ubstantial areas of procedure are cov-
ered by local rules, and these rules differ enormously across the country.”).
187 See id. at 781–83.
188 See Joseph P. Bauer, The Erie Doctrine Revisited: How a Conflicts Perspective Can
Aid the Analysis, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1235, 1293–94 (1999) (arguing that “the
importance of” nationwide uniformity has been “undermined by the flexibility, now
under attack, that has been given to individual district courts to promulgate local
rules”).
189 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
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materially different results190 asks whether the difference between the
two practices is outcome determinative in the sense described by
Hanna—that is to say, whether the difference would promote forum
shopping or the inequitable administration of the laws.191  An affirma-
tive answer to that question will lead the court to follow the state prac-
tice, unless the court concludes—under Byrd—that the federal
interest in following the federal procedure is so strong as to outweigh
the interests favoring application of the state procedure.
The question in Byrd was whether a federal court, sitting in diver-
sity to hear a state law negligence claim, should follow the state courts’
practice of allocating to the judge (not the jury) the task of deciding
whether the plaintiff was a statutory employee (a finding that would
have barred the plaintiff’s negligence claim and remitted him to the
state workers’ compensation system).192  The Byrd Court opened its
analysis of this question by asking whether the state practice was
“bound up with [state-created] rights and obligations in such a way
that its application in the federal court is required.”193  The analysis of
this question focused on the specifics of South Carolina law; the Court
inferred from South Carolina state case law that the state’s allocation
of the statutory-employee question to the judge was “grounded in the
practical consideration that the question had theretofore come before
the South Carolina courts from the Industrial Commission and the
courts had become accustomed to deciding the factual issue of immu-
nity without the aid of juries.”194  Having settled on this explanation,
the Court concluded there was no evidence “to suggest that this rule
was announced as an integral part of the special relationship created
by the [workers’ compensation] statute.”195
190 See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 467 (1965) (“The Erie rule is rooted in part
in a realization that it would be unfair for the character of result of a litigation materi-
ally to differ because the suit had been brought in a federal court.”).
191 See id. at 468 (“The ‘outcome-determination’ test therefore cannot be read
without reference to the twin aims of the Erie rule: discouragement of forum-shop-
ping and avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws.”).
192 See Byrd, 356 U.S. at 527–28.
193 Id. at 535.
194 Id. at 536.
195 Id.
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The Byrd Court conceded (equivocally)196 that the choice of
judge or jury might well affect the case’s outcome.197  But that possi-
bility, the Court reasoned, was outweighed by “affirmative counter-
vailing considerations”—namely, “the federal policy favoring jury
decisions of disputed fact questions.”198
In concluding that the federal courts’ allocation of decisionmak-
ing power between judge and jury—”[a]n essential characteristic” of
the federal system and one that implicated the Seventh Amend-
ment199—outweighed any interest in following the South Carolina
practice, the Court left room for debate concerning the nature of the
interests to be weighed in favor of following the state practice.  On
one hand, the Court stated the question as “whether the federal pol-
icy . . . should yield to the state rule in the interest of furthering the
objective that the litigation should not come out one way in the fed-
eral court and another way in the state court”—a description that indi-
cates that the interest weighing in favor of applying the state practice
was a federal interest in vertical uniformity of outcome.200  On the
other hand, in the immediately preceding sentence the Court sug-
gested that it was taking into account its prior analysis of the function
of the judge/jury allocation in the South Carolina workers’ compensa-
tion system: “The policy of uniform enforcement of state-created
rights and obligations cannot in every case exact compliance with a
state rule—not bound up with rights and obligations—which disrupts the
federal system of allocating functions between judge and jury.”201  The
Court echoed this last point when—just over a year later—it applied
Byrd to conclude that a federal court should not follow Pennsylvania’s
judge/jury allocation of decisions concerning whether a decedent was
a statutory employee (under Pennsylvania’s workers’ compensation
196 See id. at 539 (“We have discussed the problem upon the assumption that the
outcome of the litigation may be substantially affected by whether the issue of immu-
nity is decided by a judge or a jury.  But clearly there is not present here the certainty
that a different result would follow, or even the strong possibility that this would be
the case.” (citation omitted)).
197 See id. at 537 (“It may well be that in the instant personal-injury case the out-
come would be substantially affected by whether the issue of immunity is decided by a
judge or a jury.”).
198 Id. at 537–38.
199 In another equivocation, the Court invoked the Seventh Amendment but
refused to decide whether it controlled the question in Byrd. See id. at 537 & n.10.
200 See Stephen B. Burbank, Aggregation on the Couch:  The Strategic Uses of Ambiguity
and Hypocrisy, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1924, 1949 (2006) (stating that Byrd “balanced one
federal policy against another, not ‘federal and state interests’”).
201 Byrd, 356 U.S. at 537–38 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted) (citation
omitted).
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scheme).202  Some but not all commentators have interpreted Byrd to
direct that the federal interest in applying the federal practice be
weighed against the state’s interest in application of the state
practice.203
Some commentators have questioned Byrd’s vitality, noting the
infrequency with which the Court has cited the case.204  In the
Supreme Court’s most recent discussion of Byrd, it adapted that case’s
balancing test by creating a hybrid of state and federal procedure.205
The Court held in Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc.206 that New
York law set the standard for resolving new trial motions based on the
contention that the jury award on a New York state tort law claim was
excessive; thus, the New York statute’s “deviates materially” standard,
rather than the federal courts’ customary “shocks the conscience”
standard, governed.207  But whereas the New York courts applied the
“deviates materially” test de novo at two levels—the trial court and the
202 As framed by the Court, Magenau v. Aetna Freight Lines, Inc., 360 U.S. 273
(1959)—a case argued in the court of appeals prior to the decision in Byrd—involved
a similar question: should Pennsylvania’s judge/jury allocation of decisions concern-
ing whether a decedent was a statutory employee (under Pennsylvania’s workers’ com-
pensation scheme) be followed by a federal court?  The majority in Magenau
concluded without much discussion that Byrd controlled, noting that Aetna had not
attempted to argue that Pennsylvania’s allocation of the fact issue to the judge was an
“‘integral part of the special relationship’” created by the workers’ compensation stat-
ute, and that the Court had “been given no reason for the . . . Pennsylvania practice.”
Id. at 278 (quoting Byrd, 356 U.S. at 536).  Justices Harlan and Stewart dissented on
the ground that the Court should not assume that Pennsylvania’s allocation of the fact
question to the judge was “merely a ‘form and mode’ of procedure rather than ‘an
integral part’ of the rights created by” Pennsylvania’s workers’ compensation statute.
Id. at 286 (Harlan, J., dissenting).  “Before deciding such a difficult and subtle ques-
tion of local law,” these dissenters argued, “this Court should have the aid of the
Court of Appeals whose members are more competent than we to speak on Penn-
sylvania law.” Id.
203 See Bauer, supra note 188, at 1262 (“While some commentators believed that R
this [balancing] approach was merely a ‘throw-away’ in Byrd, which therefore could
be ignored in light of its disuse by the Supreme Court for more than three decades,
the Gasperini Court’s renewed attention to consideration of federal and state interests
supports reliance on this methodology for resolving Erie conflicts.”); Clermont, supra
note 3, at 1001 (criticizing as “simply untrue” the view “that Byrd’s balancing of state
and federal interests did not survive Hanna”).
204 See Burbank, supra note 200, at 1949 (“[T]he Court has not cited [Byrd] very R
often, and the thrust of its Erie jurisprudence since Byrd has been a repudiation of the
balancing process Byrd seemed to authorize.”).
205 See Clermont, supra note 3, at 1002 (“Gasperini applied Byrd to reach its result
that the federal government’s interests in controlling its courts’ standard of appellate
review outweighed New York’s substantive interests.”).
206 518 U.S. 415 (1996).
207 See id. at 461.
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intermediate state appellate court—the Gasperini Court ruled that fed-
eral trial courts’ application of the “deviates materially” standard
should be reviewed only for abuse of discretion.208 Gasperini, like
Byrd, was resolved in the shadow of the Seventh Amendment—though
unlike Byrd, Gasperini split the difference between state and federal
practices, resulting in a hybrid practice that conformed to neither.209
Significantly for purposes of the present discussion, the Gasperini
Court gave detailed attention to the legislative history of the New York
statute,210 and the resulting hybrid practice can be seen as the prod-
uct of the Court’s attempt to reconcile the particular purposes of New
York’s practice with the federal system’s interest in allocating decision-
making authority (concerning the review of jury verdicts) between the
district courts and the courts of appeals.
It is possible to view the Gasperini Court’s choice of the abuse-of-
discretion standard as one that flowed not from Byrd but from the
Seventh Amendment itself.211  But that reading is not the only possi-
ble one: if the Seventh Amendment, of its own force, dictated the
choice of the abuse-of-discretion standard, why did the Court describe
the Seventh Amendment as “weight[ing]” the analysis and “com-
bin[ing]” with “practical reasons” in leading to the choice of abuse-of-
discretion review?212
In any event, the Court has never overruled Byrd,213 and a num-
ber of lower courts continue to follow it.  Because my project here is
descriptive—I am not seeking to prescribe how Erie ought to function,
but rather to assess how courts currently apply it—it seems fair to con-
sider the implications of Byrd’s balancing test for the level of interstate
208 See id. at 438.
209 See id. at 467 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
210 See id. at 423–24 (majority opinion).  This detailed attention to state legislative
history is consistent with the approach Justice Ginsburg took, in dissent, in Shady
Grove. See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431,
1465 (2010) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
211 See Burbank, supra note 200, at 1949 n.164 (“Byrd was redundant because the R
Court evidently believed that the Reexamination Clause of the Seventh Amendment
required the standard of appellate review it prescribed.”).
212 See Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 426 (“Parallel application of § 5501(c) at the federal
appellate level would be out of sync with the federal system’s division of trial and
appellate court functions, an allocation weighted by the Seventh Amendment.”); id.
at 438 (“Within the federal system, practical reasons combine with Seventh Amend-
ment constraints to lodge in the district court, not the court of appeals, primary
responsibility for application of § 5501(c)’s ‘deviates materially’ check.”).
213 Cf. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1446 n.12 (plurality opinion) (“We are unaware of
any rule to the effect that a holding of ours expires if the case setting it forth is not
periodically revalidated.”).
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variation that is currently tolerated within the existing Erie framework.
In fact, a number of lower federal courts have applied the Byrd balanc-
ing test with attention to the role played by the relevant state practice
within the state’s system of articulating substantive rights.  Although
some lower court decisions apply Byrd’s balancing test by articulating
what appears to be a generic conception of a state interest in the rele-
vant topic,214 others have engaged in a state-specific analysis.215
2. State Court Examples
As an additional measure of the degree to which systems can tol-
erate procedural disuniformity, it is informative to look at the ways in
which the federal system requires state courts to alter their own proce-
dures when adjudicating federal claims or federal issues.  The reverse-
Erie doctrine requires a state court to apply federal practices that are
part and parcel of the relevant federal claim, despite the existence of
conflicting state procedures.216  And the independent and adequate
state law grounds doctrine has even broader reach, because it has the
potential to alter a state court’s application of its usual procedures
when the state court addresses a question of federal law in the course
of any litigation (whether the right of action is created by state or
federal law).
The scope of both these doctrines has been subject to debate
over time, and those arguing for a restrained application of one or the
other doctrine periodically point out the doctrine’s disruption of the
uniform application of the state’s own procedure.  Moreover, in the
case of the independent and adequate state law grounds doctrine, Jus-
214 See, e.g., Kohlrautz v. Oilmen Participation Corp., 441 F.3d 827, 831 (9th Cir.
2006) (finding, without first determining whether Texas or Nevada law would govern
if state law governed, “no federal interest,” and a “strong” state interest, in governing
the immunity defense of “a state court-appointed quasi-judicial officer in a suit
brought in state court and based on state law”).
215 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 190
F.3d 963, 970–71, 973 (9th Cir. 1999) (relying on California’s strong substantive inter-
est—as shown in California case law detailing history of SLAPP statute—in holding
that California SLAPP statute’s provisions concerning motion to strike and attorney
fees applied to state-law counterclaims asserted against qui tam relators); Trierweiler
v. Croxton & Trench Holding Corp., 90 F.3d 1523, 1541 (10th Cir. 1996) (relying on
Colorado court’s discussion of Colorado legislature’s intent in enacting certificate of
merit requirement and concluding that “[t]he statute is ‘bound up’ with the substan-
tive right embodied in the state cause of action for professional negligence, and
therefore it should apply to professional negligence actions brought in federal court
under diversity jurisdiction”).
216 For an illuminating discussion of the connections between the Erie and reverse-
Erie doctrines, see Kevin M. Clermont, Reverse-Erie, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (2006).
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tices have recently debated the choice between as-applied and facial
review in terms that are relevant here.
a. Reverse-Erie
Absent a valid excuse, state courts have an obligation to hear fed-
eral claims.217  Generally, state courts can apply their usual proce-
dures when adjudicating such claims.  But occasionally, those
procedures must yield to a conflicting federal procedure because the
latter is deemed an integral part of the federal claim.  A state court,
when hearing a federal claim, may have to dispense with its ordinary
practices concerning, say, notice-of-claim requirements,218 plead-
ing,219 burdens of proof,220 or prejudgment interest.221
A prominent example of this doctrine—and one that contrasts
with the decision in Byrd—is the Court’s decision some six years ear-
lier in Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown Railroad Co.222  In Dice, the
Court held that federal law required state courts to give to the jury the
question of the validity of a plaintiff’s release of a claim under the
Federal Employers’ Liability Act.  Ohio (where Dice had sued) pro-
vided a jury trial for negligence claims.  However, one issue in the case
concerned a purported release that Dice asserted had been obtained
from him by fraud; and the state’s highest court had held that ques-
tions of fraud in the execution of that release were for the judge, not
the jury.223  The U.S. Supreme Court disagreed.  The right to a jury
trial, the Court reasoned, was “‘part and parcel of the remedy
afforded railroad workers under the Employers’ Liability Act,’”224 and
was “too substantial a part of the rights accorded by the Act to permit
it to be classified as a mere ‘local rule of procedure’ for denial in the
manner that Ohio has here used.”225
Four members of the Court dissented from the Court’s opinion
in Dice (though they concurred in the reversal of the judgment).  Jus-
tice Frankfurter, writing for the dissenters, decried the majority’s
interference with the uniform application of state procedure by state
courts:
217 See Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 392 (1947).
218 See Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 153 (1988).
219 See Brown v. W. Ry., 338 U.S. 294, 295–96 (1949).
220 See Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239, 249 (1942); Cent. Vt. Ry.
Co. v. White, 238 U.S. 507, 512 (1915).
221 See Monessen SW. Ry. Co. v. Morgan, 486 U.S. 330, 335–36 (1988).
222 342 U.S. 359 (1952).
223 See id. at 361–62.
224 Id. at 363 (quoting Bailey v. Cent. Ver. Ry., 319 U.S. 350, 354 (1943)).
225 Id. (citing Brown v. W. Ry. of Ala., 338 U.S. 294 (1949)).
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The State judges and local lawyers who must administer the Federal
Employers’ Liability Act in State courts are trained in the ways of
local practice; it multiplies the difficulties and confuses the adminis-
tration of justice to require, on purely theoretical grounds, a hybrid
of State and Federal practice in the State courts as to a single class
of cases.226
As Dice illustrates, in the reverse-Erie context the goal of vindicat-
ing federal interests is sometimes in tension with the goal of respect-
ing the integrity of a state’s procedural system.  As I discuss in the next
subsection, similar tensions arise in the context of the independent
and adequate state law grounds doctrine.
b. Independent and Adequate State Law Grounds
The independent and adequate state law grounds doctrine
shields from U.S. Supreme Court review state court judgments that
rest on a state law ground that is independent of any question of fed-
eral law and adequate to support the judgment.  Prominent among
the grounds that can thus bar Supreme Court review are state court
procedural requirements; and a similar doctrine of procedural default
applies to federal habeas review of state court judgments of convic-
tion.  It is commonplace for a litigant’s failure to comply with a state
procedure to bar the litigant from seeking Supreme Court review
(and, in the case of criminal defendants, habeas review).  But in rela-
tively rare circumstances, such procedural requirements are held
inadequate to bar federal review.  The adequate state procedural
grounds doctrine can, in effect, require the state courts to abandon
certain of their usual procedures when addressing a federal issue;
thus, it is not surprising to see the doctrine elicit objections concern-
ing its disturbance of the uniform application of state law.  And the
adequate state procedural grounds doctrine also provides an interest-
ing point of comparison in the present context, because Justices have
likewise disputed whether courts applying the adequate procedural
grounds doctrine can appropriately examine the adequacy of a facially
valid state procedure as applied in a particular case.
State courts must vindicate federal rights, so long as those rights
are properly asserted.227  The U.S. Supreme Court can review a state
court’s disposition of a federal law question,228 but not if there is a
state law ground that is adequate to support the judgment below and
226 Id. at 368 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting from the Court’s opinion).
227 See U.S. CONST. art. VI.
228 See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2006).
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that is independent of the federal law question.229  One sort of ade-
quate state law ground is suggested by the caveat with which I opened
this paragraph: State courts generally may refuse to address a federal
law contention if the contention’s proponent failed to raise it in
accord with state procedural requirements.230  In relatively rare
instances, though, the Supreme Court will examine the state procedu-
ral requirement in question to verify that it truly is adequate to justify
the state court’s refusal to address the question of federal law.
There are various ways in which a state law procedural require-
ment might turn out to be inadequate to bar Supreme Court
review.231  The procedural requirement might violate due process.
Relatedly, the procedural requirement might be so novel that the liti-
gant lacked fair notice of it.232  The requirement might be inconsis-
tently applied, raising concerns that the state court might have
applied it, in the case at hand, merely to block consideration of the
federal issue.233  Or the requirement might unduly burden the asser-
tion of the federal right—a branch of the doctrine that should remind
readers of the reverse-Erie cases discussed in subsection III.D.2.a.
Like the reverse-Erie cases, the undue burden line of inadequate-
state-grounds cases asks whether a particular state procedural require-
ment unduly burdens the assertion of a federal right.  While the
reverse-Erie cases take up this analysis in the context of claims created
by federal law, the inadequate-state-grounds cases range more
229 See Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207, 210 (1935).
230 In addition to any applicable requirements set by state law, the Court’s own
policy is not to decide federal issues that were not raised in the state courts. See
Cardinale v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 437, 438 (1969).
231 See generally Daniel J. Meltzer, State Court Forfeitures of Federal Rights, 99 HARV. L.
REV. 1128, 1137–45 (1986) (categorizing instances when the U.S. Supreme Court has
held a state law ground inadequate to bar review).
232 See, e.g., Beard v. Kindler, 130 S. Ct. 612, 619 (2009) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(“We have not allowed state courts to bar review of federal claims by invoking new
procedural rules without adequate notice to litigants who, in asserting their federal
rights, have in good faith complied with existing state procedural law . . . . We have
also been mindful of the danger that novel state procedural requirements will be
imposed for the purpose of evading compliance with a federal standard.”).
233 However, the mere fact that a state court has discretion to excuse noncompli-
ance with a procedural requirement does not, in itself, render the requirement
inadequate.
Nothing inherent in such a rule renders it inadequate for purposes of the
adequate state ground doctrine. To the contrary, a discretionary rule can be
“firmly established” and “regularly followed”—even if the appropriate exer-
cise of discretion may permit consideration of a federal claim in some cases
but not others.
Id. at 618 (majority opinion) (quoting Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 362, 376 (2002)).
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broadly, because they can encompass the assertion of federal rights
during the adjudication of claims created by state law.  But a common
thread—concern for the vindication of federal rights—runs through
both lines of case law.  And a common cost appears in connection
with both doctrines.  In each instance, a ruling that a state procedure
unduly burdens a federal right prevents the application of that proce-
dure to such a claim of right234 and requires a state court to vary what
otherwise may be a trans-substantive procedural requirement.  The
undue burden cases tolerate this impairment of the uniform applica-
tion of state procedural law in order to ensure the appropriate vindi-
cation of federal rights.
There is a further way in which the inadequate-state-grounds doc-
trine illuminates the present question.  As noted in subpart III.A., the
Justices have recently debated whether the undue burden doctrine
should examine a state procedure’s adequacy only facially or also as
applied to the circumstances of a particular case.  In Lee v. Kemna,235
Lee, a habeas petitioner, challenged a state trial court’s refusal to
grant him a continuance to locate witnesses to support his sole
defense (an alibi).  The state appellate court had upheld the denial of
the continuance on the ground that Lee had failed to comply with
state rules “requir[ing] that continuance motions be in written form,
accompanied by an affidavit [and] set[ting] out the showings a
movant must make to gain a continuance grounded on the absence of
234 There has been debate over whether a finding that a state procedural require-
ment is inadequate to bar U.S. Supreme Court review prevents the state courts from
applying the requirement in future cases. See Meltzer, supra note 231, at 1151–52.  As R
I have explained elsewhere, I agree with Professor Meltzer’s view that the adequacy
doctrine should be viewed as federal common law that binds state courts.  But even
one who disagrees with this view would concede that the prospect of U.S. Supreme
Court review or of federal habeas review may lead a state court to look past litigant
conduct that it would otherwise view as a forfeiture.
235 534 U.S. 362 (2002). Lee was a habeas case, rather than a case involving direct
U.S. Supreme Court review of a state court judgment. See id. at 365.  A failure to
comply with a state procedural requirement will typically constitute a ground for
denying federal habeas review, so long as the state procedural ground is adequate, see
Cone v. Bell, 129 S. Ct. 1769, 1780 (2009) (noting applicability of adequate state
grounds doctrine in habeas), although habeas doctrine excuses such defaults in cer-
tain narrow circumstances, see id.; Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 316 (1995) (holding
that a petitioner who fails to show cause and prejudice may surmount procedural bar
by “present[ing] evidence of innocence so strong that a court cannot have confidence
in the outcome of the trial unless the court is also satisfied that the trial was free of
nonharmless constitutional error”); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 (1977)
(adopting framework excusing state-court procedural default—for purposes of fed-
eral habeas—if petitioner can show cause for the default and prejudice resulting from
it).
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witnesses.”236  The U.S. Supreme Court held that though the state
rules in question “serve[ ] the State’s important interest in regulating
motions for a continuance—motions readily susceptible to use as a
delaying tactic,” those rules, as applied in Lee’s case, were inadequate
to bar federal habeas review because he had “substantially, if imper-
fectly, made the basic showings” that the rules required:
Caught in the midst of a murder trial and unalerted to any procedu-
ral defect in his presentation, defense counsel could hardly be
expected to divert his attention from the proceedings rapidly
unfolding in the courtroom and train, instead, on preparation of a
written motion and affidavit.  Furthermore, the trial court, at the
time Lee moved for a continuance, had in clear view the informa-
tion needed to rule intelligently on the merits of the motion.237
Lee’s case, in the view of the majority, was one of those “exceptional
cases in which exorbitant application of a generally sound rule ren-
ders the state ground inadequate to stop consideration of a federal
question.”238
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas, dissented
in Lee and decried the use of as-applied adequacy review.  Such review,
the dissenters argued, slighted a state’s legitimate interests in uniform,
rule-like rules:
Procedural rules, like the substantive laws they implement, are the
products of sovereignty and democratic processes.  The States have
weighty interests in enforcing rules that protect the integrity and
uniformity of trials, even when “the reason for a rule does not
clearly apply.”  Regardless of the particular facts in extraordinary
cases, then, Missouri has a freestanding interest in Rule 24.10 as a
rule.239
The dissenters also pointed out that permitting as-applied chal-
lenges would impose costs on the state and federal courts tasked with
evaluating such challenges:
All requirements of a rule are, in the rulemaker’s view, essential to
fulfill its purposes; imperfect compliance is thus, by definition, not
compliance at all.  Yet the State’s sound judgment on these matters
can now be overridden by a federal court, which may determine for
itself, given its own understanding of the rule’s purposes, whether a
requirement was essential or compliance was substantial in the
unique circumstances of any given case . . . . The trial courts, then
236 Lee, 534 U.S. at 366 (citing MO. S. CT. R. 24.09–24.10).
237 Id. at 366.
238 Id. at 376.
239 Id. at 395 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (quoting Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S.
313, 333 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
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the state appellate courts, and, in the end, the federal habeas courts
in numerous instances must comb through the full transcript and
trial record, searching for ways in which the defendant might have
substantially complied with the essential requirements of an other-
wise broken rule.240
The Lee majority responded to the dissent’s concerns by stressing
both the rarity of successful as-applied adequacy challenges and their
grounding in prior case law.  The Lee Court emphasized that success-
ful as-applied adequacy challenges formed a “limited category” of
“exceptional,”241 “atypical”242 cases concerning “rare circum-
stances”243 in which “unyielding application of the general rule would
disserve any perceivable interest.”244  The Court accurately noted that
it had employed as-applied review in a prior case, Osborne v. Ohio.245
In fact, as I have argued elsewhere, the Court’s adequate state
grounds precedents furnish a number of examples of nonfacial ade-
quacy review.246  Occasional holdings that a state procedural require-
ment is inadequate as applied, the Lee Court stated, have not caused
undue disruption:
If the dissent’s shrill prediction that today’s decision will disrupt our
federal system were accurate, we would have seen clear signals of
such disruption in the 11 years since Osborne. The absence of even
dim distress signals demonstrates both the tight contours of Osborne
and the groundlessness of the dissent’s frantic forecast of doom.247
CONCLUSION
As Justice Scalia pointed out in Shady Grove, state-specific as-
applied review of the validity of federal rules can impose costs by mak-
ing litigation more uncertain, adjudication more difficult, and federal
court procedure less uniform from state to state.  Justice Stevens
acknowledged as much in Shady Grove: “[T]here are costs involved in
attempting to discover the true nature of a state procedural rule and
allowing such a rule to operate alongside a federal rule that appears to
240 Id. at 395.
241 Id. at 376 (majority opinion).
242 Id. at 378.
243 Id. at 379–80.
244 Id. at 380.
245 495 U.S. 103 (1990).
246 See Struve, supra note 113, at 249 (“[T]he Court’s prior analyses in a variety of R
branches of adequacy review cover a spectrum that ranges from purely facial to quite
fact-intensive.  The undue burden branch of the analysis is no exception.”).
247 Lee, 534 U.S. at 386.
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govern the same question.”248  Such costs, which I discussed in sub-
part III.C of this Article, suggest the wisdom of Justice Stevens’s propo-
sal to require strong evidence of an effect on substantive rights before
finding a federal rule to be invalid as applied.
Adopting such a proposal would leave the way open for as-applied
challenges to federal rules—thus securing the possible benefits dis-
cussed in subpart III.B—while making it easier to adjudicate such
challenges and more difficult to bring them successfully.  Litigants’
state-specific as-applied challenges, in this model, would be permissi-
ble but rarely successful.  The rare successful challenge would result in
some disuniformity in the application of federal rules.  But, as we saw
in section III.D.1, the federal courts already tolerate a not insubstan-
tial amount of interstate variation in practice, so the incremental
increase produced by the occasional state-specific as-applied invalida-
tion of a federal rule would not alter the character of federal practice.
In the same way that the federal system imposes a certain amount
of disuniformity on state courts in order to vindicate federal rights, it
may be reasonable to accommodate some disuniformity in federal
practice in order to ensure that the federal rules, as applied, do not
impinge on substantive rights (whether those rights are created by
federal or state law).249
248 Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1457
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
249 As Professor Ides observes, “In the context of diversity cases, a strict application
of the uniformity value, which occurs under Justice Scalia’s model, and which renders
state substantive law irrelevant, fails to account for the prerogatives and nuances of
state law, both of which reflect important federal policy concerns.”  Ides, supra note 5,
at 1066; see also Posting of Professor Thomas Rowe, trowe@law.duke.edu, to civ-pro@
listserv.nd.edu (Apr. 5, 2010) (on file with author) (“Maintaining uniformity in hav-
ing Federal Rules applicable is one definitely important value, but so . . . is leaving
open the possibility—which Justice Scalia would foreclose—that a facially valid Fed-
eral Rule may be invalid as applied in limited circumstances.”).
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